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Discourse Analysis of the Palestinian Authority & Islamists
NabdaY. Sh'hada*
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I. Introduction to the Thesis
I wrote this paper based on my personal experience, first as a
trainer and then as chairperson of the Palestinian Model Parliament for
Women and Legislation (MP) in Gaza. The MP was established in 1997
with the aim of proposing Palestinian laws and legislation based on
equality and human rights.' The specific objective of the MP's campaign
in Gaza was correcting the discriminatory nature of family law. The
Islamist parties, who labelled the women's actions anti-Islamic,
* When I sit down to write the acknowledgement; innumerable faces come to my
mind. My supervisor, Saskia Wieringa, motivated me to go beyond my
capability, constantly stimulating to take up new challenges. Her sharp insights
and comments enabled me to deepen my analysis. She gave me ample space to
present my views, even at times of disagreement. Lynn Welchman, SOAS,
University of London, helped me right from the formulation of the problem, and
later, as my second reader. She strengthened my arguments, thanks to her vast
knowledge in Islamic law, as well as her familiarity with the larger issues of
Palestine. Lily Ling extended valuable help during the initial phase of writing
the research design and readily provided feedback whenever necessary. Her
competence in political science helped a lot to conceptualize the link between
the gender questions and political analysis. Special appreciation goes to all the
faculty members in W&D program for their genuine care and efforts. I would
also like to thank all my friends at the ISS, who supported me throughout and
made my stay enjoyable here. Each one of them by their profound friendship
and love made me young and joyful. Finally, I would like to express
appreciation to the light of my life, my children, Hani, Karam, and Diana. But I
should admit, their phone calls and e-mails hardly helped bridge the distance
between us.
' The MP project was the culmination of four years of work by the Women's
Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), which reviewed gender-based
discriminatory laws and proposed and lobbied for amendments to them, in
addition to raising the consciousness of women about their legal rights.
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frequently intimidated the women participating in the project. That
experience, together with my twenty years of political activity for the
rights of Palestinians to their own homeland, stimulated me to look more
deeply into the reasons for the positions taken on women's issues by the
dominant forces in Palestine. Therefore, this paper is an attempt to
analyze the Islamic and Nationalist reaction to the reform movement of
family law in Palestine, and the factors determining that reaction.
The overall picture that emerges is that women's interests have
been marginalized because of the fluctuating force relations that are part
of the struggle for power in the region as well as between the Palestinian
Authority (PA) and the Islamist parties. All three actors want to expand
their boundaries. Women who want to change gender relations wish to
break out of the limitations set by traditional paradigms such as the PA
law, and the Islamist social sanctions. To do this, they rely on
international human rights conventions and the Convention to Eliminate
Discrimination Against Women. Despite the relative powerlessness of the
PA in international relations, the women's campaign carries the threat of
negative international reaction if force is used to stop them from raising
their voices.
The Islamists want to extend their boundaries to strengthen their
control over the minds and bodies of Palestinians and thus undermine the
hegemony of the PA, as well as to break out of the political boundaries
set by the PA. For this they rely on the hegemonic power of religion,
using interpretations of the Qur'an that support their control.
In an extension of their role as 'defenders of the faith', the
Islamists link any attempt to improve the lives of Palestinian women
with a perceived international (Western) conspiracy against Islam.2 The
ever-present Israeli threat acts to their benefit because they are seen as
the only force willing to stand up to the enemy. They use this in calling
for the maintenance of 'Islamic traditions' such as the veil. Thus, they
turn the bodies of women into a national treasure that needs to be
protected by men, and over which women are allowed no control.
For its part, the PA wants to go beyond the limited options
available to it as the guarantor of Israel's security under the Oslo
agreement (this agreement is discussed further in section 1.3). Therefore,
without alienating Israel, its internal policies are decided by negotiating
with the Islamists without alienating Israel, and it is in this negotiation
2 The study will show later that this is similar to the discourse of Islamists in
Egypt, but will not analyze that similarity because of time and space limitations.
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that women's interests suffer, as will be explained later in this study. The
PA uses the relevant UN resolutions and conventions to make its case
internationally for a speedy Israeli withdrawal from the occupied
territories to ensure that a Palestinian homeland can become a reality.
Internally, the PA obtains a certain degree of consent in various ways
however, it also uses coercion and force to maintain its power.
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter One introduces the
research topic against the historical and political background of
Palestine. This chapter focuses on the history of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and its relevance to the internal political power relations. The
emphasis will be on the link between the geopolitical situation and
control over women's sexuality. The chapter also outlines the research
problem and its objectives, lists the main research questions and presents
the conceptual framework, methodology, scope and limitations of the
study and the data sources.
Chapter Two presents the main concepts and theories on which
the research is based. The concepts will be defined and linked with the
thesis topic and research problem. Chapter Three examines the MP
experience with a view to using it as a basis for later analysis of the
counter-campaign in response to it. The chapter also contains an analysis
of the discriminatory nature of family law in Palestine.
Chapter Four presents the counter-campaign launched against
the MP, using the concepts chosen in Chapter 2. It also examines the
discourse of the PA and the Islamists in terms of their policies and
practices. This analysis enables us to uncover the relation between, on
the one hand, the PA's political weakness in the Middle East, and on the
other, its policies towards the Islamists and its attitude towards the
women's movement.3 It helps to analyze the gendered policies and
practices of the PA and the Islamists. Finally, Chapter Five concludes the
findings and outlines strategies that can be used by the women's
movement in Palestine for greater effectiveness towards achieving a
society built on democracy and equality.
This analysis is positioned in four contexts: international,
because the lives of all the people in the Middle East are affected by
what happens at that level; political, because Palestinians as a whole are
3 As will be explained in section 4.2, the Palestinian women's movement covers
a wide political spectrum, from the extreme left to the Islamist women's
organizations. In this study, the term is used to denote supporters of action to
achieve gender equality. Thus, Islamist women's organizations are excluded.
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affected by the political manoeuvring of regional and local actors; social,
because in Palestinian women's subordination is based on socially
constructed identity; and legal, because this study uses the reform of
family law proposed by the MP to analyze the PA's and the Islamists'
discourses.
A. The International Context
The Middle East is of high strategic value to major economic
powers because of its vast reserves of energy. This has been an important
reason for why international support is afforded to Israel, which in turn,
has affected all the countries in the region. The main international player
in the region following the break-up of the Soviet Union has been the
United States of America. In this scenario, Palestinians and others who
have little to contribute to the basic power structure in the region have no
rights. Chomsky4 argues that the basic rules of world order remain as
they have always been: "the rule of law for the weak [and] the rule of
force for the strong." The Palestinians' only role, Chomsky adds, is as
pawns in various struggles for power. However, this study does not fully
agree with him. Through a combination of resistance and negotiation,
Palestinians have up to a certain extent succeeded in convincing the
international community that they are victims of Israeli aggression.
Consequently, they have some power.
B. The Political Context
The 1993 Oslo agreement between the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and Israel was a landmark in the struggle of the
Palestinian people for self-determination and statehood. The agreement
was mediated on the basis of a severe imbalance of power between Israel
and the PLO, where Israel always had the upper hand. The Oslo
agreement "does not talk about the Palestinians as a nation, [or] as a
people, ... does not recognize the existence of the refugees, ... does not
deal with territory, with the land; [nor does it address that] the land is
separated from the people." 5 For most Palestinians, Bishara argues, the
Oslo agreement is wholly an Israeli formula,6 for by its terms the PLO
became the guardian of Israeli security rather than the security of
41id.
5 C. PARKER, RESIGNATION OR REVOLT? SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
THE CHALLENGES OF PEACE IN PALESTINE 69 (I. B. Tauris Publishers 1999).
6 G Usher, Bantustanisation or Bi-nationalism? An interview with Azmi Bishara,
1995 RACE AND CLAss 43, 50 (1995).
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Palestinians. On the other hand, the agreement enables the PA to "control
the population without reference to sovereignty - specifically those
rights over land, resources, and external relations... it allows an elite to
assert a claim to political leadership without the need to legitimate itself
through the articulation of a social agenda.
'7
The Israeli occupation has a great impact on the Palestinian
social structure. Palestinian internal politics such as alliance building and
mediation of conflicts between the different political groups and
institutions are affected by the Israel occupation. This reality had a
direct impact on the women's agenda in the occupied territories. Women
played an active role in the national struggle against the occupier and the
women were the immediate victims of Israeli policies such as
expropriation of land, demolition of houses, and imprisonment of
political activists. Their social position would therefore, have been
expected to improve with the establishment of a geographical and
political Palestinian entity. However, that has not happened, because of
the structural patriarchal relations within Palestinian society, the
powerlessness of the 'leftist parties', the weakness of the PA,8 and the
strong popularity of the Islamist parties.
Bishara observes that since 1971, the PLO's nationalism has
been in transition from a policy of liberation to one of statehood?
Several significant events and factors can be identified in the PLO's
quest for statehood: the PLO's military defeat in Lebanon; the rise of the
national movement, especially the Intifada' 0 in the occupied territories;
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Gulf war was another
7 Parker, supra note 18.
8 The PLO established the Palestinian Authority to govern the areas from which
Israel withdrew after the Oslo agreement in 1993. The PLO continues to exist as
an organization representing Palestinians as a whole.
9 Usher, supra note 19.
10 Intifada (meaning "uprising") was a mass protest over the Israeli occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza. It started in December 1987 and continued until the
beginning of the so-called "peace process" initiated by the U.S. after the Iraqi
defeat in the second Gulf war of 1991. Its main activities changed from mass-
based actions to prolonged and institutionalized actions. The main objective of
the uprising was to exhaust the occupying power rather than to evict it through a
combination of local and international pressure. The most remarkable features of
the Intifada were not only the participation of Palestinians from all sectors and
classes, but also the ease with which mobilization was carried out and the
support structure built within few months after its eruption. J. HILTERMANN,
BEHIND THE INTIFADA (Princeton University Press 1991).
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watershed because it changed the international and regional balance of
power, putting the PLO in danger of being reduced to nothing more than
a disintegrating bureaucracy located in Tunis, without funds. Its only aim
was survival and its only claim to legitimacy was that it represented
Palestinians. However, its support among Palestinians was declining as
the Intifada gained momentum. All these factors made it possible for the
Israelis to recognize the PLO and led to the signing of the Oslo
agreement on September 13, 1993. For Bishara, the agreement originated
a process which sustained Israel's historical position of neither full
withdrawal from, nor annexation of, all the occupied territories. It
addressed the problem of no status quo ante"1 by making the PLO
responsible for Israel's security from Palestinian attacks without
allowing Palestinians the right to self-determination.' 2
The PA's poor performance opens the door to further criticism
from all sectors of the political spectrum, 13 particularly with regard to the
autocratic and authoritarian style of its head. The rising popularity of the
Islamists is one expression of this criticism. Hamas, the largest Islamist
party, is primarily a creation of the Israeli occupation.1 4 Hasan contends
that Israel nurtured and allowed Hamas to act without interference for a
long time 1 . One indication of this was that until the killings inside
"Usher, supra note 19.
12 See Noam Chomsky, The Israel-Arafat Agreement, Z MAGAZINE, Oct. 1993;
Noam Chomsky, Middle East Diplomacy: Continuities and Changes, Z
MAGAZINE, Nov. 1991; M. Rabbani, Palestinian Authority, Israeli Rule: From
Transitional to Permanent Arrangement, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND
INFORMATION PROJECT, 1996; G. USHER, DISPATCHES FROM PALESTINE; THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS, (Pluto Press 1999) (discussing in
detail the shortcomings of the Oslo Agreement).
13 J. Hilal, The PLO: Crisis in Legitimacy, RACE AND CLASS (1991).
14 Palestinian activists of the Muslim Brotherhood (a pan-Islamic political
movement founded in Egypt in 1937) founded Hamas (the Islamic resistance
movement) in February 1988, two months after the eruption of the Intifada.
Hiltermann, supra note 23. The Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood
had emerged in the occupied territories in the 1970s as a "cultural and social
movement whose primary aim was the founding of the Islamic personality ...
this entails an abstention from all forms of anti-occupation activity, prioritizing
instead a cultural struggle against the PLO's atheist commitment to secular
nationalism." G. Usher, What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the
Occupied Territories, RACE AND CLASS (1995).
15 M. Hasan, On Fundamentalism in Our Land, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM
LAWS (Grabels 1993).
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Israel increased, the number of Hamas prisoners in relation to the size of
the organization was lower than that of prisoners from other
organizations. Usher makes a similar observation, that despite its
propaganda against Jews, "Hamas" relation with the occupation
authorities remained essentially quietest, with the [Israeli] army never
interfering with Hamas strike days." 16 Hamas is financed by Saudi
Arabia, the most conservative country in the Arab world. Usher notes
that, "[Il]ubricated by Saudi money, in Gaza especially [Hamas] built an
impressive social infrastructure, by 1986 controlling 40% of Gaza's
mosques and its single Islamic university, which with 7,000 students,
was the largest in the territories."
17
As Hilal observes,
[T]he polarization of political forces between the
'nationalist secular Right' (represented by the biggest
movement in the PLO, Fatah, allied to a locally based
bourgeoisie) and the Islamists . . . has tended to
marginalize the Palestinian Left. Thus, a sizeable sector
of Palestinian society (committed to democracy,
political, cultural and religious pluralism, equality and
social justice) remains without a platform and a unifying
organizational framework.'8
The political vacuum in Palestinian politics due to the weakness of the
Left has been filled by two alternatives. One is the revival of the
traditional social structures encouraged by the PA, and the second is the
increased popularity of the Islamic parties. In both cases, the big losers
are Palestinian society, particularly Palestinian women. The reform and
renewal of national institutions and the democratisation of the political
and social process remain the most urgent problems facing Palestinians.
It is necessary to articulate a clear conception of a democratic Palestinian
state and the rights and duties of its citizens, as well as the State's
responsibilities to the citizens, in a framework encompassing all
Palestinians, men and women.
16Usher, supra note 27, at 65-80.
'
71d.
18 M. Klein, Quo Vadis? Palestinian Authority Building Dilemmas Since 1993,
1997 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 383 (analyzing the dilemma that shared by all
the Palestinian political parties after the signing of the Oslo agreement).
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C. The Social Context
Part of the land on which the state of Israel was established in
1948 was Palestinian. Thus, the creation of Israel transformed the
Palestinian people into a refugee nation, affecting the social and physical
life of a people of essentially peasant origin. The social fabric of the
refugee Palestinians continued to be based on patriarchal relations. This
may be seen as evidence of the sense of security and solidarity that such
relations provided to the refugee groups. In 1967, Israeli military forces
occupied the remnants of Palestinian land. The occupation and its brutal
treatment of the people gave rise to local self-help organizations forged
as forms of resistance. A national liberation movement with a developed
infrastructure of institutions - student groups, labour unions, women's
committees, agricultural and medical relief associations, and other
voluntary works organizations19 - took away power from traditional
landowners and began building popular institutions which had a great
influence in the political arena and which Israel found impossible to
eliminate.
Although there was substantial political development of
Palestinian society, gender relations, social stratification and "traditions"
were not transformed much. Palestinian political organizations developed
within an environment that endorsed tensions between two opposing
discourses: on the one hand, the social relations of patronage2 and
personal power and authority'21 and on the other, the discourse of
national struggle, liberation, national rights, citizens' responsibility, and
political values. 22 The confrontation between the two continued until
19 Hiltermann, supra note 23; L. Taraki, Al-Mujtama' Al-Filistini Waki Wa-
Twajhat Maasira, RAMMALLA BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY, 1997.
20 R. Brynen, The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation, JOURNAL OF
PALESTINE STUDIES XXIV(3), (1995); R Brynen, The Neopatrimonial Dimension
of Palestinian Politics, JOURNAL OFPALESTINESTUDIESXXV(I) (1995).
21 In this contex, Sharabi is an important source for analysis of the distortions in
Arab "neo-patriarchal society." H. SHARABI, NEOPARTRIARCHY, A THEORY OF
DISTORTED CHANGE IN ARAB SOCIETY (Oxford Press 1988). Referring to the
patronage system in the Arab world, which could equally easily be applied to
Palestinian society and Palestinian politics, Sharabi notes that "society actually
is only subject to the will of the rich and powerful, a will delimited only by
material capacity and institutionalized ethical injunction." Id. at 47. In sum, all
social arrangements in neo-patriarchal society are based on this powerful-
F2owerless relation.Taraki, supra note 32.
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1993, when political changes culminated with the signing of the Oslo
agreement. As a result of these opposing discourses, when we investigate
the legacy of the Palestinian national movement, we find several layers.
At the political level, PLO institutions succeeded in shaping the
parameters of political institutions and grassroots organizations in the
occupied territories. To confront the occupiers' power, the PLO
developed a strategy consisting of three elements: assailing the
occupiers' power and its institution; outadministrating the enemy by
setting up parallel hierarchies; and creating a new hegemony of
23resistance. This strategy contributed successfully to mobilizing broad
sectors of society into mainstream politics, even those that had
traditionally been kept out of formal politics. Thus, a promising local
leadership emerged in the1970s and a new generation of activists became
involved in mass organization.24 The Israeli occupation, which affects
every aspect of the people's lives and the discourse of resistance applied
by the PLO and its constituting organizations, began the process through
which politics became a part of everyday life in Palestine. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the world of politics has been separated from its
narrow-elite base practice.
Palestinian women were part of this process, forming women's
mass-based committees 26 in an effort to respond to the needs and
aspirations of Palestinian women under occupation.27 These committees
were organized in villages, refugee camps and towns. The political
participation of Palestinian women within the PLO organizations did not
23 Hiltermann, supra note 23.
24 Taraki, supra note 32; 1. Jad, Claiming Feminism, Claiming Nationalism:
Women's Activism in the Occupied Territories, in THE CHALLENGE OF LOCAL
FEMiIsMs 226 (Amrita Basu ed. 1995).25 Taraki, supra note 32.
26 According to Jad, the first women's committee was formed on International
Women's Day in 1978. Jad, supra note 37. Its purpose was to reach the
majority of Palestinian women living in villages and in the refugee camps of the
West Bank and Gaza. Id. The activists in the committee "were also seeking an
alternative to the charitable societies, whose leaders excluded them in order to
? reserve their own position and power." Id. at 232.
The author suggests women's status in Palestinian society is marked by
contradictory features. On the one hand, women participate actively in political
life and their educational level has improved considerably; on the other, they are
still constrained from equality and participation in the public arena. Such
constraints are evident in the high fertility rate, relatively low participation in the
labor market and legal discrimination against women, especially in family law.
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imply a feminist consciousness or the promotion of a feminist agenda,
since every activity had to be under the political banner of the PLO
organizations. Thus, the public has perceived the women's movement as
an extension of the political parties rather than as a "feminist
movement." Several researchers have observed that the women's
movement, while not differing in philosophy from faction to faction,
lacked coherent goals and strategies, and was unable to speak with one
voice.28 Joseph says that the women's movement within the national
struggle has carefully avoided challenging patriarchal structures, thus
deflecting the emergence of feminist consciousness.
29
The discourse of resistance attracted every Palestinian to
participate and shape the future of Palestine, regardless of his region
(village or refugee camp), gender or age. Mayer30 refers to the paradoxes
created by the occupation in the lives of Palestinians. For instance,
children were actively encouraged to confront, and rewarded for
confronting, the occupation forces with what might be termed
undisciplined behaviour; however, at the same time fathers expected
those same children to obey their authority unquestioningly. Hiltermanrd'
refers to the fact that women's participation in the Intifada was a clear
manifestation of "casting off the yoke of gender oppression.' a2
Developing in such an environment, the Palestinian political and
organizational structure has remained conventional on the social level.
The structure has found expression in a nationalist discourse which gives
significance to an idealization of the past and "tradition" in a way that is
similar to that of other nationalist movements. The repression of
28 M. Mayer, Development and Human Rights in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
Defending the Rights of the Poor (1997) (on file with the Center for Economic
and Social Rights, New York).
29 S. Joseph, Women and Politics in the Middle East, 16 MIDDLE EAST REPORT
1, 3-8 (1986).
30 Mayer, supra note 41.
31 Hiltermann, supra note 23.
32 By their active participation in the Intifada, Palestinian women broke the red
line of the public/private dichotomy. Id. The striking images of women
marching in the streets, throwing stones at Israeli soldiers, carrying baskets of
stones to supply younger demonstrators, arguing and tussling with soldiers to
win the release of an arrested demonstrator, originated the idea that the Intifada
was not only about" 'shaking off of military rule, but ... a social revolution in
its own right." Id.
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occupation had a significant impact on Palestinian life that makes
traditional practices a meaningful way of expressing identity.
33
Moreover, the family is the basic and most important unit of
Arab society. The extended family is still important despite the fact that
Palestinian society has moved towards a nuclear family structure over the
last thirty years. Marriage, as an institution, is of unmatched importance
for obtaining recognition in the adult community, especially among the
poor and refugees.34 Marriage is often not simply a bonding between
individuals, but also a bond between families. 35 Therefore, it strengthens
and consolidates patriarchal relations based on clans and tribes and has
contributed to the maintenance of traditional practices.
Sharabi convincingly argues that "the dominance of the father
(patriarch), the centre around which the nation as well as the 'family' are
organized," is as much a psychological feature of Palestinian society as it
is of Arab society; "[t]hus, between the ruler and the ruled, the father and
child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings the paternal will
is the absolute will, mediated by a forced consensus based on ritual and
,,36
coercion.
In the nationalist discourse, women are the symbolic "container"
of Palestinian identity. The glorification of women's fertility, the
recognition of their bodies as the most important part of national
resources, and the encouragement to bear more children as part of the
national struggle against the Israelis was an explicit expression in the
Palestinian national discourse. Yasser Arafat has said, "[tihe wombs of
Palestinian women are bombs in the confrontation with the Israelis."
Therefore, "in the context of Intifada ... Palestinian men are interested in
increasing the Palestinian population, and the Israeli occupiers are
interested in limiting it, women's bodies [are] the site of the battle with
little control left to them over their own bodies. 37
33 Mayer, supra note 41.
34 R. Hammami, Women in Palestinian Society in Palestinian Society in Gaza,
West Bank and Arab Jersalem; a Survey of Living Conditions 283 (FAFO
Publications, 1993) (analyzes attitudes towards marriage in Palestinian society).
35 Mayer, supra note 41.
36 Sharabi, supra note 34.
37 j. Massad, Conceiving the Masculine: Gender and Palestinian Nationalism,
49 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 467 (1995).
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D. The Legal Context
In the twentieth century, Palestinian women and men have been
subject to a succession of overlapping legal systems of non-Palestinian
origin. For example, the framework delineating the formal legal status of
Palestinian women in terms of their personal rights was shaped during
the Ottoman period (before the First World War). Later, during British
colonial rule over Palestine, in spite of critical questions raised by
women concerning their social and legal status, they were excluded from
decision-making, power, and governance. The marginalization of
Palestinian women continued during the national struggle, when the
national movement's priority was liberation: social, economic and legal
issues facing the society were sidelined, in particular those deeply
affecting the Palestinian women who were also part of the national
struggle. The elections for the first Palestinian Council in 1996 presented
new opportunities for Palestinian men and women to debate the laws and
policies that would direct their social affairs. The Palestinian Model
Parliament for Women and Legislation was launched in 1997 as part of a
comprehensive effort to highlight the discriminatory nature of the
inherited legislation in general and family law in particular. The project
initiated the study of women's status under the current laws, specifically
under family law, and the best approach to improving their legal status
under this law.
E. Indication of the Problem
The MP (MP) project conducted its advocacy campaign in 1997-
98, addressing modification of family law as its main objective in Gaza
Strip, while in the West Bank its objective was to review all the current
laws in Palestine. In Gaza, the project was based on the recognition that
family law is a crucial determinant of women's legal, social, economic
and political status. The campaign came at a crucial time in Palestine's
political evolution towards statehood, and it tried to address a complex
range of legal issues in order to propose effective gender-sensitive laws
and policies.
The MP's campaign and activities elicited different responses
from the gendered male-dominated political institutions. This thesis will
analyze the politics of these institutions and the way in which they
arrange and conduct their political alliances and conflicts. It will discuss
the policies and practices of the main actors, namely the PA and the
Islamist parties. It will examine how Palestinian women are
conceptualized within family law. As implemented in Palestine, this law
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has led to the reinforcement of male domination and female
subordination, and it is reasonable to expect that the nature or
conceptualization of this law will have a direct impact on the way
Palestinian women lead their lives in the future.
F. The Actors
Various actors played a role in the reaction to the MP: the PA,
the Islamists, formal religious institutions, the women's movement, the
leftist parties, human rights organizations, etcetera. However, the actors
that were most influential were the PA and the Islamists.
G. The Palestinian Authority
The PA represents a state under formation which limits its
options with regard to external pressures. It has followed a strategy that
compromises women's rights by paying lip-service to the gender
question. This was demonstrated clearly when the conflict between the
Islamist parties and the MP reached a critical point, with the MP raising
the issue of equal rights for women in family law, and the PA adopted a
position closer to that of the Islamists.
To analyze the PA's contradictory positions, we have to
understand that the Oslo agreement is essentially a security arrangement,
which includes, among other things, a commitment by the PA to
safeguard the state of Israel from its Palestinian opponents. To meet this
obligation, the PA has engaged in various activities such as the initiation
of repressive practices, including imprisonment and regular torture of
political opponents, under the all-embracing justification of "national
interest." In this context, the PA's pandering to the Islamist parties on the
issue of modifying family law can be interpreted as a tactic to keep the
Islamists occupied in a confrontation with the MP, thus diverting some of
their attention from confrontation with Israel. This study will analyze this
tactic in greater detail, showing why and how social questions, including
the women's agenda, provide space for political bargaining between the
PA and the Islamist parties.
H. The Islamist parties
The Islamists constantly emphasize that Palestinian society is
locked in daily struggle with a neighbouring country that makes no secret
of its enemy. Thus, they construct Palestinian identity as one under
threat. Because the household is perceived as the domain of women, they
are the preservers of this identity. To Islamists, this status legitimizes
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control over their bodies and voices. Any attempt to modify family law
is, by definition, a challenge and threat to national and religious identity.
This study uses the term Islamists rather than fundamentalists
because the latter term is a value-laden concept which tends to be used in
the context of political terrorism. In this study, there is no intention to
characterize the military strategies of any of the actors.
I. The Research
The overriding purpose of this study is to explore the factors that
are hindering the attempts of Palestinian women to improve their
position in their society, in order to determine ways of making their
attempts more effective.
This study will attempt to answer the following questions:
1. Why and how, despite their ideological and political differences, do
the PA and the Islamist parties cooperate to sacrifice women's interests
and hinder them from putting their concerns on the public agenda?
2. How can we conceptualize the political alliance between the PA and
the Islamist parties as two polarized political forces acting together to
exclude women's interests from the public agenda?
3. What are the underlying motives and interests behind the gendered
policies of the institutions under analysis?
Discourse analysis is used in this study as a critical tool to
understand and analyze the function of the male-dominated institutions
that control women's sexuality in Palestine. Discourse analysis (with
specific reference to the Foucauldian perspective) "seeks to explain the
relations and forces of power from the discursive evidence available. It is
a version centrally concerned with the social interests inherent in
particular ways of governing subjects and, as such, has important
political implications for the present."38 It "expands the field of potential
political activity ... avoiding, as it does, the reductionism of single-cause
analyzes.,39 Discourses should be analyzed in terms of "what reciprocal
effect of power and knowledge they ensure" and "what conjunction and
what force relationship make their utilization necessary.' O
Documents/articles and literature will be cited to support the analysis of
the underlying agenda and motives of the institutions, as well as of the
38 C. WEEDON, FEMINISM, THEORY AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 115
(Oxford 1999).
39 1d at 122.40 id.
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institutional structures, policies, practices and discussions relevant to the
MP's campaign.
II. The Conceptual Framework
This chapter defines the concepts that are used for the analysis in
the rest of the thesis. As noted in section 1.8.4, the concepts were derived
from the discourse analysis methodology used in the study. They were
chosen to analyze the Islamists' and the PA's discourses as well as to
determine why and how women are marginalized in Palestine.
The factor that most influences the lives of Palestinians is power
politics. On the international level, the weak position of Palestine makes
it vulnerable to pressures from the dominant power in the region (Israel)
and the U.S. On the national level, the PA appropriates the Islamic
discourse and uses patriarchal and nationalist discourses as part of its
power politics to build its hegemony. The Islamists try to strengthen their
hegemony by using patriarchal and Islamic discourses as well as
resistance against Israel as part of their power politics. The difference
between the PA and the Islamists, as will be argued in Chapter 4, is the
PA's appropriation of the Islamic discourse. Both the PA and the
Islamists, as patriarchal institutions, suppress women to maintain their
hegemony. The women's movement cannot consider either of them as an
ally, as will be elaborated later in this study.
A. Discourse
Discourse is a comprehensive tool for examining the meanings
underlying the actions and statements of various actors as well as the
institutions and structures of which they are a part. Michel Foucault, in
his attempt to understand the relationship between language, social
institutions, subjectivity and power, identifies discourses as "historically
variable ways of specifying knowledge and truth. They function as sets
of rules, and the operating of these rules and concepts in programs,
which specify what is or what is not the case." 2
41 This thesis does not claim to study the whole range of male-dominated
institutions in Palestine, nor all of their gendered policies and practices. Rather,
the focus is only on the institutional response to the MP campaign as being
representative of the attitude towards the position of women in Palestine.
42 C. RAMAZANOGLU, Up AGAINST FOUCAULT, EXPLORATIONS OF SOME
TENSIONS BETWEEN FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM 19 (Routledge 1993).
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Unlike structuralists, who understand discourse as the study of
smaller bits of language such as sounds, parts of words, meanings, and
the order of the words, Foucault considers it as having more than
linguistic meaning. "It is material in the sense that it is located in
institutions and practices which define difference and shape the material
world, including bodies. ' 43 Thus, social meanings are produced within
social institutions and practices in everyday life.4
Foucault's question is not about the source of discourses, or what
interests they represent, but the effects of power and knowledge and what
makes their use necessary." Therefore, individuals who are shaped by
institutions are agents of change not the authors. This change may either
serve hegemonic interests or challenge existing power relations. That
makes the individual a site for competing and often contradictory forms
of subjectivity, which together constitute a particular person.
In this sense, discourses determine the meaning of being a
woman or a man and the convenient range of gender-suitable and
inappropriate behaviour. We learn how to think and behave through
discursive practices, which shape our bodies, minds, and emotions.
Discourse does not reflect meaning and subjectivity; rather, it
produces them. This makes language and subjectivity a field of political
struggle involving both the defining difference in discourses, which have
different degrees of power to shape social relations. Therefore,
resistance to power comes through new discourses which produce new
truths. These may be counter-discourses, which oppose dominant truths,
or reverse discourses. However, that does not mean that discourse is
divided between the accepted discourse and the excluded one. Discourse
is a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various
strategies. It transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to
thwart it. 45 To sum up, discourse is the universe where power is
constituted. Thus, it cannot be captured because it is everywhere.
By this definition, the discursive field of the law, for instance
(since we are discussing family law), has several discourses, but not all
of them possess equal weight or power. Some will justify the status quo,
others will challenge the basis of the current practices or institutions;
43 D. Tannen, Discourse Analysis, available at
http://www.Isadc.org/web2/discourse.html.
44 C. WEEDON, FEMINIST PRACTICE AND POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORY 25 (Basil
Blackwell 1987).
45 M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Vintage Books 1980).
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however, such discourses are marginalized or dismissed by the
hegemonic system of meaning and practices by labelling them as
irrelevant or bad.46 For example, the Palestinian National Authority
ensures equal rights for men and women.47 However, another article in
the Basic Law makes the Sharia the main source of legislation. The
hegemonic culture of Islam, Islamist power, and the PA's patriarchal
nature would give less weight to equal rights for men and women than to
the maintenance of Sharia as the main source of legislation.
Moreover, the legal devices in a society are not homogeneous;
they depend upon the groups that are involved in the legal procedures
and performance (judges, the police, lawyers, etc.). However, one set of
discourses is dominant and reflects "particular values, class" and gender
interests.48 The views of dominant discourses about what is "natural
justice" are different from those of the challenging discourses. For
instance, depriving mothers of custody over their children is "natural
justice" according to the dominant discourse of Family Law, while the
discourse of the women's movement (which is both a counter-discourse
as well as a reverse discourse) seeks to move the hegemonic discourse to
"a position of relative powerlessness." 9
For marginal discourses such as the feminist one to have a social
effect even when they lack social power, they must at least be circulated
and announced in order to offer discursive space to individuals who seek
help in the face of the dominant discourse. The degree to which marginal
discourses can increase their social power is controlled by the broader
context of social interests and power within which struggles with the
dominant discourse are formed.50 Of course, the feminist discourse does
not expect to win the battle merely by raising its voice and declaring its
challenge. In an environment of patriarchal social relations, the power
balance needs to be changed as well.
B. Power
Power is included in this analysis because relations in all
societies are based on the relative strengths of the actors. That makes
46 id.
47 Palestinian National Authority, An English Translation of the Basic Law for
the Palestinian National Authority in the Transitional Period, at
http://.pal.plc.org/english/laws/blaw.htm.
48 Weedon, supra note 56, at 36.49 Id. at 37.50 Id.
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power an obvious and necessary concept for use in this analysis. This
study uses Foucault's conception of power as a moving set of force
relations that exist everywhere and all the time.
Foucault's understanding of power is not as a set of institutions
and mechanisms that regulate the relation between the State and citizens,
or as a mode of subjugation which has the form of rules, or as a general
system of domination exerted by one group over another. He regards
these as only the terminal forms of power. For Foucault, power is
understood as:
[T]he multiplicity of force relations imminent in the
sphere in which they operate and which constitute their
own organization; as the process which, through
ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms,
strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these
force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain
or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and
contradictions which isolate them from one another; and
lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose
general design or institutional crystallization is
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the
law, in the various social hegemonies.5 '
In this definition, power is perceived not as a constant block
located in some central point, but as a moving substance of force
relations, which, due to their inequalities, generate certain ranks of
power. The second element of Foucault's definition is his understanding
that force relations occur in an infinite process of mobility; therefore they
are generated in every moment and everywhere. Power is thus constantly
present and it is everywhere.
The essential question here - posed by many feminist
critics of postmodernism - is whether this means that we
are mere passive effects of discourse, deprived of
agency. Post-structuralist feminists would answer in the
negative, arguing that it is only by assuming forms of
51 FOUCAULT, supra note 57.
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subjectivity, which include the dimension of agency, that
we can think, communicate and act in the world.52
Power relations are not located outside other types of relations,
such as economic processes or sexual relationships. Power relations are
the immediate effect of the inequalities in those relations. In this sense,
power relations do not only play a repressive role; on the contrary, they
are productive wherever they come into play For Foucault, power is
repressive only in "its most frustrated and extreme form. The need to
resort to a show of force is more often evidence of a lack of power."53
The only framework within which this viewpoint makes sense is
if power is defined in terms of hegemony achieved through the consent
of the population. Thus, absence of consent (and therefore lack of power)
necessitates the use of force to maintain hegemony. However, from a
different perspective on power, Foucault's theory does not stand up. If
power is regarded as the ability to use force, then the use of force cannot
be seen to indicate a lack of power. Would we consider the state of Israel
to be manifesting a lack of power because of its violent use of force? If
we generalized this argument, all the countries that ignite war would be
viewed as powerless, and all men's violence against women would be
due to their powerlessness!
Foucault focuses on "how certain institutional and cultural
practices produce individuals. Disciplinary power is exercised over the
body and soul of the individual" in society by the dominant discourse. 54
Although this increases the power of individuals, it also renders them
more docile." For instance, the disciplinary (institutional) power that is
exercised over women's bodies is clear in family law, which represents a
masculine discourse that legitimizes the domination of men and
subordination of women.56 The disciplinary power is clear when we
notice that even the most radical women are not prepared to challenge
the basis of this law as a masculine discourse; they contest the legal
52 WEEDON, supra note 51, at 104.
53 j. SAWlCKI, DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT (Routledge 1991).54 1d at 22.
55 A. KARAM, WOMEN, ISLAMISTS AND THE STATE: CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM
IN EGYPT (Macmillan Press 1998).
56 Scott argues that gender is not only the primary field where power is
articulated, it is also the "persistent and recurrent way of enabling the
signification of power in the Judeo-Christian as well as Islamic traditions." J.
SCoTr, FEMINISM AND HISTORY (Oxford University Press 1996).
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provisions from within the framework of this masculine law.
"Disciplinary practices create the division" between what is considered
right and wrong, of good or bad Muslim, of legal criminal, which by
"virtue of their authoritative status, can be used as effective means of
social normalization and social control."" The wearing of the veil that is
imposed by the Islamist parties separates "good" and "bad" women, and
maintains Islamist control by labelling that which is different as
abnormal.
Foucault's "bottom-up" analysis of power shows "how power
relations at the micro level of society facilitate certain global effects of
domination, such as class power and patriarchy.,5 8 Yet, according to
Foucault, power also has the capability to create resistance - not by the
choice or decision of individuals, but because power that is embodied in
force relations based on inequalities naturally and inevitably arouses
some form of resistance.
Foucault conceives force relations as a network that runs through
all the social body; it takes shape and comes into play in the modes of
production, familial relations, and institutions. Then these force relations
embrace the local oppositions and link them together in a series of
arrangements that reflect the power relations in the social body at a
specific moment. The domination of a certain discourse (a patriarchal
discourse in the Palestinian case) is the outcome of these sustained
confrontations between the opposing elements of force relations.
59
Azza Karam analyzes a similar phenomenon in Egypt.60 She
discusses the relations between the State, Islamists, and the Egyptian
feminists, and finds that:
Power oscillates from one [player] to another in a series
of reactions and contradictions. Islamists' power is a
reaction to state power, as well as inherent to Islamic
dynamics in itself. The same is true in reference to the
relationships between Islamists and feminists, and
between feminists and state. In fact, the power of
Islamists, state laws, and feminists lies in a complex
interplay of resistance to each other.
6 1
57 SAWICKI, supra note 65, at 22.
5 1d. at23.
59 FOUCAULT, supra note 57.
60 KARAM, supra note 67.
61 id.
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The position of the actors (whether the State, Islamists, or
feminists) allows for diverse degrees and types of agency; sometimes
agency is manifested as compliance with or support to the dominant
hegemonic power, "thus forming a chain or a system." 62 However, at
other times it takes the shape of resistance, "the disjunctions and
contradictions which isolate them from one another.'6 3 In all cases, it
shows the "process which, through ceaseless struggles and
confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses" the force relations
between actors.64
Foucault's definition of power is useful for examining the
mechanisms by which power is exercised and the relations between
powerful and powerless individuals. However, it is not enough by itself
for an analysis of relations between the powerful and powerless at the
institutional level. Therefore, this study also uses Gramsci's concept of
hegemony to supplement the analysis. Gramsci is useful for
understanding power relations between two institutional actors but
cannot be used in a context of multiple conflicting discourses. In such a
situation, Foucault is more relevant.
C. Hegemony
Karl Marx was the first to use the concept of hegemony in the
context of historical materialism, with reference to the interests of the
ruling class being presented as ideal universal interests. According to
Marx, when the ruling class comes to power it serves a broad range of
interests; but in the course of time, as contradictions develop with other
classes, the specific interests of the ruling class become apparent and the
stratagem of identifying its interests with the common good is used
increasingly in attempts to paper over the contradictions.
Gramsci builds on this notion of hegemony when he recognizes
civil society as the major vehicle for bourgeois hegemony. He locates
hegemony as operating at the "private" or non-State levels of the
superstructure, and he distinguishes this social hegemony from the use of
force as the principal means of maintaining social order. Cultural
hegemony, which is generally identified as the major dimension of this
"manipulation," involves the production of ways of thinking and seeing,
62 FOUCAULT, supra note 57, at 92.
63 id
64 id
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and of excluding alternative visions and discourses. Hegemony, in brief,
is the manufacturing of consent.65
This conception of hegemony leads Gramsci to expand his
definition of the State to include not only the governmental apparatuses
and coercive mechanisms, but also "the underpinnings of the political
structure in civil society ... the church, the educational system, the
media; all the institutions [that help] to create in people certain modes of
behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social
order."66 The hegemony of a dominant group thus bridges the
conventional categories of State and civil society.
Hence, hegemony is the ability of a social group to exercise a
function of political and moral direction in society; for hegemony to
succeed, it should be acknowledged by other social groups, they have to
appreciate the hegemonic group's leading role. The leading group's
power is something more than and different from "dominance." Gramsci
defines it as the "combination of consent and coercion 6 7 to the extent
that when "the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront; hegemony
prevails."6 8 "Coercion implies the use of force or the credible threat
thereof; consent implies moral leadership.'6 9
To sum up Gramsci's viewpoint, the process of attaining
hegemony involves both attaining consent and using force as necessary,
with both allies and opponents. As will be seen later, this method of
attaining hegemony is practised by the PA. It is also important to note
that hegemony is a historical concept; it is a process which is never fixed
forever in time.
Charlie Bertsch links hegemony with the construction of identity
in society. 70 In an interesting article on the Internet, she successfully
uses the concept of hegemony to reflect on identity construction, finding
65 G. MARSHALL, DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (Oxford University Press 1998).
66 R. Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in
Method, in GRAMSCi, HISTORICAL MATERNALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 49 (S. Gill ed. 1993).
67 G. Arrigi, The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism in Gramsci,
HISTORICAL MATERNALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 148 (S. Gill ed.
1993).
68 Cox, supra note 78, at 52.
69 Arghi, supra note 79, at 149.
70 C.Bertsch, UsefulFictions, at
http://English-www.hss.cmu.edu/bs/19/bertsch.html.
E-mail: Berstch.cbertsch@crl.com.
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that Gramsci's description of hegemony is significant in this context in
two ways. Firstly, hegemony acts as a "kind of cultural 'glue' which is
able to bind and hold together very different sectors of modem societies,
even ones that have little or nothing in common.'7 i Secondly, hegemony
resolves real differences into a semblance of unity by creating and
sustaining an illusion. It makes possible the perception of conflicting
sectors as somehow alike, sharing a common identity. Hegemony thus
creates a fiction of collective identity. This is evocative of the Marxian
description of how a ruling class tries to hide the contradictions between
its interests and those of other classes.
In this connection, Althusser argues, "there is no escape from
ideology. Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to
their real conditions of existence. Because our minds always mediate our
relation to reality, 7 2 we have no ability to have direct access to it.
Therefore, it is only through socially constructed fictions that we define
ourselves and our place in the world. Bertsch notes that if we cannot
escape from ideology in general, that means there is a lot at stake in
determining which specific ideologies dominate our lives. Since
hegemony depends on the creation of a collective fiction of identity, only
a "specific ideology can hold sway over the majority of people in a
society" at any one time.73 This approach can be used as a point of
departure to analyze the dominant ideology in Palestinian society in
order to strengthen the alternative hegemony. This alternative hegemony
needs to construct an ideology adequate to its own political project.
Bertsch's contribution is helpful in analysing the strong cultural
hegemony of Islamic ideology in Palestinian society. As mentioned
earlier, discourse, too, does not reflect meaning and subjectivity, but
rather produces them. This makes subjectivity (or identity in Bertsch's
terms) a field of frequent political struggle involving both the defining
and contesting of differences in discourses (which appeared as hegemony
and counter-hegemony by Gramsci and Bertsch).
Karam uses this identification in her analysis of the relation
between the Egyptian State and the Islamists:
The relation between the state and the Islamists is a
dynamic one, which involves periods of covert
71 id.
72 id.
73 id.
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encouragement on the one hand, and severe repression
on the other. It is the consent of the state to allow the
dominance of an Islamic discourse by participating and
employing it, and the implied consent of some Islamists
to work within state structures and institutions. The
encouragement takes place at a time when Islamist
activity can prove useful as a means to reach the ends of
the state in terms of consolidating its ideological
hegemony. When these groups are seen to overstep the
tolerance afforded by the state, then a severe cycle of
repression starts.74
The struggle between the two groups is seen in terms of discourses
involving power and hegemony. For the Egyptian State, it is an action to
sustain power and hegemony, while in the case of the Islamists, it is a
battle to acquire political power and develop their counter-hegemony.
When the use of force is too risky, the exercise of moral
leadership is problematic, "corruption," and "fraud" may temporarily
step in as surrogates of power. Thus, "corruption and fraud are tactical
weapons in a rearguard struggle to preserve power. They are expressions,
not of power, but of a failure of power. [However,] hegemony, in
contrast, is the additional power that accrues to a dominant group by
virtue of its capacity to pose on a universal plane all the issues around
which conflict rages."
75
Here we notice the difference between Foucault's and Gramsci's
conceptualizations. For Foucault, the use of force indicates lack of
power, while Gramsci considers coercion an essential component of
leading-group power. Gramsci advances his analysis a step forward by
assigning another element: it is with corruption and fraud that the leading
group expresses its lack of power.
Another important aspect of hegemony identified by Gramsci is
the inability of a group to become hegemonic unless it understands its
own interests and aspirations. The group also has to retain an ability to
respond to its allies' interests and motivations derived from their position
in society. If the hegemonic group neglects its allies' interests, it will
74 KARAM, supra note 67, at 25.
75 Arrighi, supra note 79, at 149.
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eventually fail and be replaced either by force or by a true "ethical"
hegemony.76
In this regard, Gramsci's conception of the State contrasts with
the "narrowly defined 'night watchman' State of liberal economists and
the 'interventionist' State associated with Bismarck. 7 The State
dominates not through sanctions, punishments or inducements; but by
providing "intellectual and moral leadership.'*8 Hegemony is exercised
within a wider social and political constellation of forces, or what he
called the "historical bloc." This concept refers to a historical conformity
between material forces, institutions and ideologies. In a process which is
almost like constructing a discourse, a successful "historical bloc" should
be politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas, providing
strategic direction and coherence to the constituent elements. The role of
intellectuals becomes essential. As Gramsci stresses, intellectuals are
needed to supply intellectual and moral support to the hegemony's
dominant political role, to the point where "what is 'politics' to the
productive [and potentially hegemonic] class becomes 'rationality' to the
intellectual class. 79
Therefore, for counter-hegemony to win, it has to confront the
hegemonic group at every level. "For a new historical block to emerge,
its leaders must engage in 'conscious, planned struggle;' [it should] not
only have power within the civil society and economy, [but] it also needs
persuasive ideas and arguments which build on and catalyze its political
networks and organization. '0
D. Power Politics
Power politics is a useful tool for analyzing relations between
dominant and subordinate powers, especially at the international level. It
explains how one actor uses power to influence or compel another actor.
It was chosen for its capacity to explain the political changes in the
76 E. Augelli & C. Murphy, Gramsci and International Relations: A General
Perspective with Examples from Recent U.S. Policy Toward the Third World, in
GRAMSCI, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 148 (S.
Gill ed. 1993).
77 S. Gill & D. Law, Global Hegemony and Structural Power of Capital, in
GRAMSCI, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 93 (S.
Gill 1993).
78Id.
79 Id.
so Id.
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Middle East that led to the Oslo agreement and the emergence of the PA
as one of the main actors in Palestinian society. It is also linked with the
concept of hegemony. Power politics is a frequently used term in
international relations. It suggests relationships between independent
powers, and implies that there are independent political units (states) and
that there are continuous and organized relationships between them.
8 1
However, in this study it stands for the conduct of international relations
through force or the threat of force, without considering rights and
justice. This meaning is especially relevant in the Middle East, where the
experience of four wars in a relatively short period has inextricably
linked power politics with the use of force.
At the heart of any study of international relations, there must be
the question of how competing demands within and between different
states can be resolved. The tools used in the discipline of international
relations to provide an answer to this question are the concepts of power
and influence. Power at the international level is defined as "the capacity
of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to
affect the behaviour of other nations.'4 Anderson observes that "power"
is always perceived as one country having the capacity to compel another
country to act in a way it does not want to act. In contrast, influence is
defined as "the ability to get someone to do something you want via
simple persuasion rather than the implicit or explicit threat of or use of
sanctions. 83 He cites the ability of the U.S. to force Israel to negotiate
with the PLO because of the political strength derived from its military
success in the Gulf war as an example of this definition of power.
84
However, it can also be argued that the Arab countries were in a
weak position after the Gulf war and the defeat of the Iraqi forces (this
was also true of Saudi Arabia, which, while appearing stronger, was
crippled financially). Therefore, the so-called peace process was
established on the basis of a substantial power imbalance between the
Arabs and the Israelis. This made it easier for the Israelis to give in to
U.S. pressure to negotiate with the PLO.
If politics in international relations (and to a certain extent in
national relations as well) is defined as a struggle for power, then the
next question is, what are the elements of power? Holsti sees power as
81 H. BULL & C. HOLBRAAD, POWER POLITICS (Penguin Books 1979).
82 J. ANDERSON, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POWER, JUSTICE AND DEATH: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13 (Routledge 1996).83 Id. at 14.
841d.
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being made up of "three elements: capabilities, acts and responses.85
Capabilities are resources that can be used by one actor to influence
another. Acts are the processes and relationships with which an actor
influences another. Responses are the actions of the target of the
influence attempt." Thus, in international relations, to "say a state is
powerful may mean that: (1) The state has a large amount of resources
for use in influence attempts. (2) The state is undertaking a large number
of actions to influence other actors. (3) The targets respond in a manner
consistent with the desires of the state making the influence attempt."
86
It is interesting to see how this compares with Foucault's
conception of power. As we saw earlier, Foucault defines power as,
among other things, "the process which, through ceaseless struggles and
confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses force relations." This
summarizes the final two elements in Holsti's definition of power.
However, an important component of Foucault's conception is that power
is not located in some stable, central point. It is the constant interaction
of force relations that defines it. On the other hand, Holsti's first element
of power (resources) implies that power usually resides in a specific
location. This would apply even if the material resources that constitute
that power were geographically dispersed. Thus, the power of a state
could reside in the legislative and/or executive branches of government,
no matter where its material resources came from (of course, providing it
had the capability to ensure an uninterrupted supply of those resources).
Thus, while Foucault's analysis of power can be used to explain
interactions within countries, it is insufficient for analysis inthe context
of international relations. The power of the U.S. in the Middle East is
obviously rooted in the elements defined by Holsti.
E. Nationalism
Nationalism has increasingly occupied a central place in gender
debates, for it re-conceptualizes women's relations to states and nations.
The re-examination of ethnicity, nationhood and citizenship within the
gender focus has resulted in highlighting important and marginalized
aspects of these issues. Sometimes nationalism is applied with reference
to citizenship and state building, at other times in relation to ethnicity.
However, most of the time it is connected with consciousness, aspirations
85 R. STOLL & M. WARD, POWER IN WORLD POLITICs 2 (Lynne Rienner
Publishers 1989).86 id.
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and sentiments. Nationalism is such a strong force that it has even been
called the new religion, or replacement for religion.87
Feminists have discussed the concept critically with reference to
the public/private distinction and women's being deprived of their rights,
or discrimination against women in general. Yuval-Davis observes that
nationalist projects and gender relations influence each other in different
contexts.88 Gender is fundamental to the development of culture,
nationalism, and social and political movements, for it is in the name of
the "nation" that the position of women has often suffered. National
unity is used to rationalize postponement of the solution of women's
problems. "Priority is thus given again and again to other problems and
excludes both popular demands and women's claim for a better status in
their society.... The time for women's demands is never now." 89
The arguments surrounding this concept are many and space
limitations do not permit their exploration here. Therefore, this
discussion will confine itself to a general definition, major debates
(specifically the feminist critique) and finally a focused reflection on
Palestinian nationalism and its relation to the gender question.
Nationalism appears to be viewed from a deterministic
perspective. Gellner regards history as a succession of technologies, each
generating a specific socio-political order? In this context, nationalism
is the style of politics best suited to current industrial societies because it
needs homogenous languages and culture in order to be effective.
Therefore, where nationalism does not exist, it is necessary to invent it.
According to Friedland, "[e]ven when there is no sense of nationhood
before the establishment of the colony, colonialism creates it," in the
sense that it stimulates resistance from the colonized people which the
national movement later uses to construct the nationalist discourse'9 It is
possible, if not likely, that the idea of nationalism has never in itself
moved anyone. It takes hold only in a constitutive medium in which it
87 p. JAMES, DURKHEIM AND WEBER: THE ANTINOMIES OF ABSTRACT
NATIONALISM - NATION FORMATION, TOWARDS A THEORY OF ABSTRACT
COMMUNITY (Sage 1996).88 N. YUVAL-DAviS, GENDER AND NATION (Sage 1997).
89 M. Helie-Lucas, The Preferential Symbol for Islamic Identity, WOMEN LIVING
UNDER MUSLIM LAWS (Grabels 1993).
90 N. Yuval-Davis, Nationalism, Racism and Gender Relations (1992)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Institute of Social Studies, The
Netherlands).
9' Hiltermann, supra note 23.
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has meaning, not because the idea cannot be profoundly influential, but
because it needs intellectuals to invent national communities. This, of
course, assumes that certain objective preconditions for the formation of
a nation already exist. The author accepts this view of nationalism in this
study because nationalism cannot exist as an abstract idea; it is a
constructed discourse.
Yuval-Davis concurs that the nationalist discourse involves a
political project; a claim for separate political representation which takes
the form of a claim for a separate autonomous "nation-state.'92 She is
critical of Gellner's definition of nationalism as:
.... [A]theory of political legitimacy which requires that
ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones,
and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given
state [...] should not separate the power holders from the
rest [...] and therefore state and culture must be linked.93
Yuval-Davis notes that the definition excludes minorities (and,
indeed, women) from important power resources, and that there is no
place in the world where such a "pure" nation-state exists.94 She also
disagrees with the historical typology of Smith, which differentiates
between two types of national projects: the "ethnic-genealogical" and the
"civic-territorial.'0 5 Yuval-Davis regards Smith's dichotomous division
between culture-nation and state-nation as one that conflates origin and
culture. According to her, a diversity of national projects constitute
dimensions of national ideology. Therefore, she differentiates between
the state-nation, culture-nation, and folk-nation. In other words, she
differentiates between national ideologies that focus on citizenship of a
specific state (in specific territories), those that focus on specific cultures
(or religions), and finally those that are constructed around the specific
origin of the people (or their race). Then she argues that all of them could
be connected with racist exclusion. In later analysis this study will use
Yuval-Davis' concept, especially with regard to how the Islamist
discourse identifies women with the "other" in order to exclude them.
92 YUVAL-DAVIS, supra note 100.
93 Id.
94 id951id
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F. Nationalism and Women's Position
Feminists who tackle the subject "seek to understand why
women are 'hidden' in the theorization on nationalist phenomena.'
9 6
The construction of gender roles has always been influenced by the
articulation of nationalism. Kandiyoti argues that the integration of
women into modern "nationhood" follows a different trajectory from that
of men; for instance, the protection of women's "sexuality" constitutes a
"crucial distinction between the nation and its others.'9 7
Yuval-Davis relates gender to class, ethnicity and the State,
arguing that each of these variables shapes, and is shaped by, the others
in concrete social relations.9" She suggests that these categories have
been constructed according to varying historical contexts. Three
interlocking domains influence gender relations: the State, civil society
and the family. Each sphere has its own ideological context and access to
economic and political resources. These domains are heterogeneous in
their nature and have different meanings for different ethnic groups, for
classes, and for men and women. The relations of the family and civil
society with the State are not homogeneous but they refract through a
complex web of social, political and economic power relations.
Examining the concept of citizenship, Yuval-Davis argues that
gender relations are closely linked to citizenship rights. Citizenship
determines the notion of "otherness" between individuals and genders.
She sees it as primarily a political construct, operating as an exclusive
and inclusive category defining the relationship between the State and
the citizens. The type of State determines the rights and duties of the
individuals and groups within it. She illustrates her argument by referring
to the situation of Palestinian women living in Israel. To define their
citizenship, we have to study their membership in the Israeli Palestinian
community (class, religion, location, abilities, stage of lifecycle), and that
of the Israeli Palestinian community in relation to Israel as well as in
relation to other Palestinian and Arab communities. In addition, the
positioning of both Israel and the "Arabs" internationally is also relevant.
The spheres of family and civil society relate in different ways to
notions of citizenship and nation-making. Yuval-Davis argues that in
most pre-industrial states and some countries in the contemporary period,
% Id.
97 D. Kandiyoti, Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation, in WOMEN
LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAws (Grabels 1997).98 YuVAL-DAVIS, supra note 100.
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kinship ties often form the foundation for political alignments in which
women have few rights. In other cases, genealogical ties provide the
major reason for pushing some women into the political hot seat. Then
she concludes that political rights are the most important, and that social
enabling or "empowerment" is necessary to make them meaningful:
Citizenship rights are anchored in both political and
social domains. Without "enabling social conditions,
political rights are vacuous. At the same time,
citizenship rights without obligations also construct
people as passive and dependent. Citizens' most
important duty is, therefore, to exercise their political
rights and to participate in the determination of their
collectivities', state', and societies 'trajectories.
Walby agrees with Yuval-Davis; she argues that political
citizenship [in the West] was the basis of the transformation from private
to public patriarchy, and suggests that women would not be able to
practise their civil and social rights without attaining their political
rights. 00 However, this study agrees with the concept of "politics" and
"citizenship," which are not neutral. It can be argued that for women to
attain political rights, they have to strip "politics" and political culture of
its masculine authority. Therefore, women's movements must propose a
new definition of citizenship; they need to "present a new image of
citizenship that includes both political and social aspects, [and] which
responds to the needs and demands of women and takes into account
gender, class, and ethnic differences in a pluralistic framework.
G. Nationalism and Culture
Gender relations are significant cultural and political markers of
nationhood, as Kandiyoti argues, women could simultaneously
participate actively in, and become hostage to, nationalist projects. 10' In
the Third World generally, a distinction has been built into nationalist
ideology around a separation of the domain of culture into two spheres -
99 YUVAL-DAVIS, supra note 100, at 92.
100 S. Walby, Women and Nation, in MAPPING THE NATION (G. Balakriohman ed.
1996).101 Kandiyoti, supra note 109.
Fall 2003
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
the material and the spiritual. 10 2 It has been argued that the West is able
to dominate and subjugate Third World countries because of its scientific
and technological strength and rational forms of economic organization.
To overcome this subjugation, the Third World must learn these superior
techniques. However, some nationalists emphasize that such learning
should not be allowed to "contaminate" the spiritual domain of their
countries.
Chatterjee argues that nationalist discourse shows a clear
dichotomy between the outside and the inside (the material domain lies
outside us and is ultimately unimportant).10 3 It is the spiritual that lies
within our true self which should be secured. When this distinction is
applied, we discover that the inside is the domain of the
home/private/family, while the outside is the world/public/male. The
private/home has to be preserved "uninfected" by the material world; and
women are apparently representatives of the private. 104 The nationalist
discourse in fact supplies an ideological principle of selection. It is not a
dismissal of modernity; rather, it is an attempt to make modernity
consistent with the nationalist project.
For Palestinian men in the occupied territories, the world/public
was a place of oppression and daily demoralization, where the Israeli
military rules had to be obeyed. It was a place where the Palestinian man
experienced his worst humiliations. At the same time, it was the place of
struggle and daily fight; it was a battle to free the homeland. Enloe
comments, "nationalist movements have typically sprung from
masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized
hope."'1 5 However, it is still a "safe" battle as long as the men have the
ability to protect their homes/private sphere/women/honour, etcetera. For
Palestinian men, the memories of the 1948 Dayr Yasin village massacre
and 1982 Sabra-Shatila massacre in Beirut, provide enough lessons. In
both massacres, the targets were women and children. 0 This was a
102 P. Chatterjee, The Nationalist Resolution of the Women's Question, in
RECASTING WOMEN 204 (K. Sangari & S. Vaid eds. 1993).
103 Id.
'04 This distinction between public and private has been the subject of a long
discussion among feminists. Walby argues against the conflation of 'private'
with 'family;' for her, private means the individual's autonomy; thus the family
is not 'private' for women. Walby, supra note 112.1o3 Id.
'06 The difficult protector/protected relationship constructs the male as citizen-
warrior, and women (and children) as needing protection. The male attitude to
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deliberate tactic to demoralize the Palestinian men because they could
not protect the great number of civilians. 07
Critics have argued that over the last few years (especially
during the Intifada), the promotion of patriarchal dominance and
traditional values of honour and modesty by conservative groups has
played into hands of the Israeli intelligence apparatus. The military
occupation authorities have been able to coerce some women into
collaboration by blackmailing them with photographs covertly taken in
"compromising" locales such as hair salons. These critics suggest that
this challenges traditional definitions of morality and raises the question
of social versus political priorities: is it more important to preserve
family honour or to resist the presence of Israel in Palestine? However,
that is not the correct question to ask. The important questions are: How
do we analyze the Islamists' discourse? How do we examine the
effective means by which they use the occupiers' practices to build their
hegemonic power in Palestinian society? The Islamist discourse is one of
honour and shame, relying on the traditional definition of manhood that
associates masculinity with "national strength.' 08 It operates in order to
establish power over the secular parties and to exclude Palestinian
women from public life and send them back home. It is the protector's
discourse, exactly mirroring the practices of the Israeli security forces. It
helps the Islamist parties to exhibit their "capacity" to take over the role
of real protectors of the nation's honour.'0 9 The leftist and secular parties
women moves from protected through possession to control. Women become
vulnerable to socially accepted violence from men in their own-group if they
appear rebellious or if the burden of protection becomes threatening to the men.
Those who are unable to protect their women can be feminized as not real men.
J. Pettman, Boundary Politics: Women, Nationalism and Danger, in NEW
FRONTIERS IN WOMEN'S STUDIES: KNOWLEDGE, IDENTITY AND NATIONALISM
(M. Maynard & J. Purvic, eds. 1996).
107 Peteet indicates that the Israelis deliberately exploited Palestinian cultural
norms in this way for purposes of intimidation. J. PETEET, GENDER IN CRISES:
WOMEN AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (Columbia University
Press 1991).
108 Pettman says the nationalists frequently represent the nation as a woman
under threat of penetration or domination, so her sons must sacrifice for her
safety and honour. It is noticeable that an association has been built up between
the colonized nation and the female body on one hand, and the imperial power
and male heterosexual rape on the other. Pettman, supra note 118.
'09 Scott, analyzing the Islamist's discourse in Iran, notes that the emergent
rulers (the Khomeini regime) legitimized domination, strength, central authority
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are portrayed as having less honour, being less masculine and less
nationalist, because of their liberal ideas about women's emancipation.
However, even the leftists accepted the Islamists' restrictions on
women's participation in the public struggle, citing the need to maintain
"national unity against Israeli."
H. Patriarchy
Much has been written about the concept of patriarchy by
feminist authors. The concept revolves around two themes: patriarchy as
male dominance characteristic of society, and patriarchy as an
autonomous system. Fox criticizes the reductionist approach, which links
the social structure based on patriarchal relations with the innate male
desire for power. l° She argues that to analyze patriarchy we have to
integrate processes of generational reproduction at all levels: the level of
the individual's reproduction in daily life through housework and mother
work, as well as the level of producing gender identity and ideology.
More importantly, in order to analyze gender inequalities, we should
make a linkage between the level of the social structure and the level of
the individual.
Eisenstein defines patriarchy as:
... . [T]he process of politically differentiating the
female from the male, as women and men. Patriarchy in
this sense is the politics of transforming biological sex
into politicized gender, which prioritizes the man while
making the woman different (unequal), less than, or the
"other". This process of differentiating woman from man
while establishing the privilege of men operates partially
on the level of ideology that centers the phallus in the
series of symbols, signs, and language while dividing the
private world from the public world. And it
simultaneously establishes the sexual division of labor,
and ruling power as masculine (while enemies, outsiders, subversives, and
weakness were feminine); and made that code literal in law by forbidding
women from participating in politics. She argues that the State has nothing to
gain from the control of women. However, such control is exercised for the
construction and consolidation of power. Scott, supra note 67.
i"O B. Fox, Conceptualizing Patriarchy, THE CANADIAN REV. OF SOCIOLOGY
AND ANTHROPOLOGY 163 (1988).
VOL. I I
GENDER & POLITICS IN PALESTINE
the distinctness of family and market, patriarchal
controls within the market, and so on."'
This definition, as Fox notes, gives the political arena a meaning of
social structure and a division of social life into public and private, which
institutionalizes the division of labour by sex. Fox seems unsatisfied with
the conceptualization of patriarchy as just defining the social structure;
she believes that patriarchy has to be understood as production and
reproduction of people, which involves the family primarily but not
exclusively. This definition fits the conceptualization of discourse and
power in this study. Patriarchy as a discourse does not reflect our
subjectivity as men and women, but rather it produces them; it produces
gendered individuals with different degrees of power. At the same time,
individuals are not just victims of patriarchal discourse; they also
produce it, reproduce it, and change it. In spite of this strong agency,
however, individuals cannot do away with it.
Patriarchy as a discourse is located in the patriarchal institutions
(for example, family and State) and practices (for example, gender and
sex-based discrimination). These institutions and practices define
differences between women and men and shape the material world of
production and reproduction. Patriarchy is to be found in the legal, social
and religious spheres. As mentioned in the analysis of power, patriarchal
relations work at both the micro and macro levels of society. They
facilitate male dominance and female subordination in patriarchal
society. Thus, Foucault can be used to analyze patriarchy at the micro
level, while Gramsci can be used for analysis at the macro level.
However, in this study, there is no analysis of patriarchy at the family
level and so Foucault's concept is not used in the context of patriarchy.
Moghadam outlines the main features of patriarchal relations in
the Middle East: restrictive ways of behaviour for women, rigid gender
segregation, and a powerful ideology linking family honour to female
virtue.1" 2 Control over women's bodies is important as they are "regarded
as a potential source of fitna- that is, moral disorder." 113 The social and
economic changes in the Middle Eastern countries have influenced
patriarchal relations. Specifically, the modernity discourse,
111 Id.
112 V. Moghadam, Revolution, Islam and Women: Sexual Politics in Iran and
Afghanistan, in NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES (A. Parker, M. Russo, D.
Sommer and P. Yaeger eds. 1993).
113 id.
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industrialization, and the emergence of the nuclear family have affected
patriarchal relations.
In Palestine, patriarchal relations intensified during the Israeli
occupation due to several elements." 4 The most important was the
transformation of male Palestinians from peasants to proletarians
working in the Israeli labour market. In the peasant economy, the family
was the main unit of production and reproduction; however, when the
men started working outside, an exclusive division was created between
production (public) and reproduction (private). This strengthened
patriarchal relations inside the family.
Patriarchy was solidified at the national level by the PA, as
shown by Abdo, who notes that the PA is very much a rule of one
person, the president, who not only controls the interior and exterior
ministries, and the security forces and police, but also heads the
Executive Authority." 5 The president is responsible for all high-level
appointments, which gives him a degree of concentrated control. This
enables him to appoint people for reasons that have little to do with
qualifications or experience, or even in some cases with the real need for
the position itself. It is quite clear that the appointments are usually made
on the basis of affiliation to Fatah (the leading party) or clan allegiance.
Furthermore, many women have been appointed to governmental
positions by virtue of their membership of the Fatah movement or
through the assistance of their relatives or friends in the PA. Nepotism is
nowadays a widespread phenomenon in PA institutions: it is a normal
outcome of the high importance given to family ties and clan loyalties.
Therefore, the number of women in the government should not be seen
as a sign of their qualifications or gender sensitivity on the part of the
PA. As Yuval-Davis argues, in most pre-industrial societies, familial ties
provide the major reason for pushing some women into the political hot
seat.
This trend contributed to the consolidation of the extended
family rule and has reversed the tendency to give prominence to political
affiliation over tribal or clan membership that which happened during the
Intifada. It is obvious that the strengthening of the role of patriarchy by
empowering the clan and tribe has implications for women's position in
society. Abdo mentions that this trend affects women negatively. For
example, in "the cases of domestic violence, when the male head of a
114 Id.
11lSId
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family is seen as the guardian of the family's female members, it
becomes more difficult for women's organizations and NGOs. . .to
intervene."'1 6 This supports the argument by Pettman that there is a
connection between social control and violence against women, and
between these and the wider structures of gendered power.
117
Il. The Model Parliament Experience
This chapter describes the main features of the MP, its main
demands, and most importantly the main elements of the debate among
the MP members. The debate revolved around the competing discourses
in Palestinian society 1 8 Some members pointed out that tactics should
be devised in the context of the real strength and popularity of the
Islamic discourse, and suggested using verses of the Qur'an119 and parts
of the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet) that support the feminist cause
but which are ignored by the dominant interpretation of the Qur'an.
Other members said that such new interpretation would employ the same
selective methodology as that of the dominant Islamic institutions.
Moreover, they said, the issue is not so much one of interpretation as of
power relations; feminists interpreters of Islam would never have more
authority than the male dominated institutions.
The chapter also presents the main components of family law in
Palestine and its discrimination against women. The last section outlines
the debate among the MP members about the proper approach to
reforming family law.
A. The Structure of the MP
The MP was a networking project between a number of human
rights centres, women's centres, and women's coalitions. It was
established in 1997 with the aim of bringing together all parties
interested in proposing Palestinian laws and legislation based on equality
and human rights. A preparatory committee was established to draft the
161d.
117 Pettman, supra note 118.
118 Although the discussion in the MP was about legal issues, it was necessary to
refer to discourses in all spheres of Palestinian society, including religion,
culture, politics, etc.
119 The Qur'an is the holy book of Islam and to Muslims, its text is the words of
God as revealed to the Prophet by an angel.
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strategies and goals of the project. The implementing organization is the
Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC). 20
The MP began with planning sessions in all regions of the West
Bank and Gaza. The activities resulted in the election of 88 members in
the West Bank and 120 members in the Gaza Strip. The parliamentary
seats were divided equally between men and women. The participants
were representatives of political parties, members of the Legislative
Council, human rights activists, representatives of women's
organizations and grass-roots organizations, as well as some mullahs and
members of Islamist parties. Several meetings were held in a
"parliamentary atmosphere" in which the laws and regulations were
discussed and amended. Members of the MP participated in central
sessions towards the end of the MP project. The MP conducted several
training courses and workshops on current laws and regulations and
international law for its members in several regions in Palestine. It also
gave training in lobbying and campaigning techniques. The MP's
activities were financed by the British Council in Palestine and the Dutch
funding agency.
121
In order to provide the MP participants with the opportunity to
debate women's rights from different perspectives, the trainers conducted
a series of training sessions and workshops. The training sessions were
on human rights and included contemporary readings in religious thought
dealing with women's rights and the position of women in Islamic
legislation. The training sessions compared the findings of Muslim
thinkers from many different periods and regions. In these discussions,
participants distinguished between religion and religious thought,
religion being the Qur'an, religious thought being human interpretation
of the Qur'an. In discussing the Islamic doctrines on which the
subordination of women is based, most of the MP participants agreed
that human attempts and opinions are always subject to debate. However,
some Muslims, especially those engaged in political Islam, consciously
confuse their interests with Qur'anic verses. They search for
justifications of their objectives in fragmentary and gender-biased
interpretation of Qur'anic verses.
120 Unfortunately, some of the documents produced by WCLAC in the run-up to
the MP were unavailable in The Netherlands while writing the paper and so
could not be used for this study.
12! Novib is a Dutch funding agency which works in the Palestinian occupied
territories and it has been involved in promoting various development activities
including those projects that empower Palestinian women in diverse fields.
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The members of the MP were all conscious of the fact that the
issues before them were basically a matter of power relations. Thus, their
problem was to find solutions that would help to build a new, more-
balanced equation that would strengthen the feminists discourse while
keeping the realities of Palestinian society in mind There were two main
approaches to doing this. Some participants argued that the Islamists
should be confronted on their own ground and challenged on the basis of
new and progressive readings and interpretations of the Qur'an. They
called for a feminist interpretation of the Qur'an as a way to strengthen
the feminist discourse.
The second viewpoint came from some "secular" members in the
MP; who said that Islam's position on women's rights in general is
ambiguous at best; and that Islam's compatibility with women's rights
cannot be easily resolved. They added that the Qur'an would have to be
read selectively and subjectively to find supportive verses, and thus the
feminist interpreters would use the same methodology as the dominant
religious institutions. Furthermore, the feminist interpreters would have
fewer texts to support their perspective, while the "traditional" Islamic
school of thought has at its disposal an arsenal from the mainstream of
the Islamic heritage. In addition, they described women's battle within
Islam as a losing one, not only because Islamic texts contain clear ideas
of male superiority, but also because the authority of feminist interpreters
of Islam would never be greater than that of the male-dominant
institutions.
These members also argued that efforts to search through Islamic
texts for evidence of sympathy for women would be unfruitful from the
"liberal" viewpoint. Their strong argument was that women's struggle for
their rights should be seen as a political struggle within the power
structure of society and that any attempt to obscure this fact would serve
the opposition. Therefore, the battle should be conducted politically,
taking into account the power relations of society and the dominant
patriarchal relations in every aspect of life in Palestine and in the Islamic
world in general.
In terms of religious practice, this "secular" group called for
personal choice at both the public and private levels, but not as abody of
personal status laws imposed on all members of society. They strongly
argued, with historical evidence, that if the MP members compromised
their rights and strategies, then the chances of democratization and
gender equality would be damaged.
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Historically, Palestine has been ruled by different powers. Thus,
Palestinians are governed by different laws in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. The laws in the West Bank are based on the Jordanian legal
system, while those in the Gaza Strip are based on the Egyptian legal
system. This made it necessary for two central sessions to be held, one in
the West Bank (on 28-29 March 1998) and the other in the Gaza Strip (on
25-26 April 1998). Participants agreed on the need to amend and unify
the civil laws in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The West Bank
session focused on the legal status of Palestinian women and ways of
improving women's conditions, taking into consideration the fact that
women's rights are an integral part of human rights. The session in the
West Bank was devoted to discussion of women's political and civil
rights, including penal legislation and the rights of employment,
education and health care.
Unlike the session in the West Bank, the one in Gaza exclusively
discussed the Palestinian Family Status Laws and ways to amend them in
a spirit of equality, non-discrimination and respect for women's human
rights. Participants found through textual analysis that certain articles in
some laws supported unjust treatment of and discrimination against
women and represented a barrier to women's participation in developing
their country. These laws were also discussed in relation to the
Palestinian Declaration of Independence of 1988, which seeks to found
the Palestinian nation on the basis of justice, equality and respect for
human rights. The debate over the laws is discussed later in this chapter.
At the end of its central session, the MP in Gaza published a
press release to clarify its stand following the Islamists' counter
campaign. The press release listed the main demands of the MP and
declared that the achievements and recommendations of the Central MP
should by no means be the last stage in the campaign. It affirmed the
need for further efforts at all levels to bring the campaign to its desired
end - amendment of the civil laws as an essential step in achieving a
society built on the principles of justice, equality and the rule of law. The
press release called on everyone who disagreed with the MP to discuss
the issues on the basis of mutual respect, not closed-mind claims of
absolute truth. It also called on all those who questioned the MP's
objectives to avoid demagogic rhetoric and engage in rational dialogue.
The press release emphasized the fact that Palestine, Palestinian
society, and religion in general belong to all Palestinians, and no one has
the right to claim the ownership of absolute truth. Finally, it declared that
the achievements and accomplishments of the MP represented only one
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step towards building an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital,
and a strong civil society based on the rule of law, effective legislative
authority, equality and justice. This indicated the MP's awareness that the
feminist agenda cannot be dissociated from the political context of
Palestine.
One of the activities of the MP was a national campaign to
collect signatures for a petition based on collective demands identified
during meetings held throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For this
purpose, individual committees were formed in all regions, representing
governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as the
Palestinian syndicates and representatives of the political parties. The
demands in the petition were based on international conventions, and
principles of human rights and women's rights. The petition called for
confrontation and not evasion of the issue of women's rights. By the end
of April 1998, over 15,000 people had signed the document to express
their support for the campaign. The petition was submitted to the
Palestinian Legislative Council.
The activities of the MP were publicized through a wide media
campaign. The media component constituted the main feature of the
project, with media committees being established and a media strategy
being developed. A series of messages and slogans for the media
campaign were identified. The brief of the media committee also
included informing the public of the MP's activities. A bi-monthly report
was sent to the AI-Ayyam newspaper (the second-most-widely-read
Palestinian newspaper) for publication as a supplement. The official TV
station and other local TV stations, Palestinian Radio, and local
newspapers regularly covered the activities of the project. Billboards and
giant posters about women's rights and equal participation in the building
of society were placed in different parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
A comprehensive evaluation was conducted at the conclusion of
the project's activities. One of the main achievements of the project was
its success in reaching thousands in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Other
achievements included raising the awareness of political parties,
especially the leftists, about issues specific to women and lobbying with
them for better laws for a Palestinian society based on justice and
equality. In an interview with a Palestinian journalist, three members of
the MP later also listed the following achievements: The MIP initiative
sparked a debate that had been missing from Palestinian society for a
long time. The MP members were able to communicate their objectives
to the people despite the counter-campaign. Its campaign succeeded in
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ensuring the right of women to discuss their situation and the
discrimination against them in the current laws. Members crossed the
limits and taboos set by some Islamists that forbid the people from
discussing the Shari and in implementing the slogan that "the national
and social struggle have to be carried out side by side," the MP filled the
vacuum left by the democratic movement.1
22
B. The Family Law in Palestine
The "Personal Status Law" (also referred to as family law) in
Palestine originates from Jordanian and Egyptian laws, which in turn are
of Ottoman origin and rely on the Islamic Sharia.123 The Jordanian law is
implemented in the West Bank, while the Egyptian one is implemented in
the Gaza Strip. 24 In modem-day Palestine, these laws have not been
changed or amended due to the Israeli occupation. Palestinian women
activists and lawyers have written several revisions and critiques of the
Personal Status Law, discussing the discriminatory articles in it. 5 The
focus of the MP was to deal with matters of marriage, divorce and child
122 Z. Othman, AlParlaman Al souri bayna al tagdeed wal khowlaba, 19
ALSYASA ALFALASTINIYA 57 (Summer 1998).
123 There is no clear idea about what constitutes the 'Sharia'. It has never been
defined or collected in a systematic manner or in a single written body of work.
The Sharia is best understood as shared ideas of Islamic society, based on a
literature that is broad but not necessarily consistent or approved by any single
authority. This situation contrasts with the legal systems in the contemporary
world, where the law is defined as a systematic set of sections written into a
code and authorized by a specific elected body. However, the Sharia does not
have such a specific form; therefore it is known as an uncodified set of laws.
Strictly speaking, the Sharia is not a set of 'religious' laws, in that it covers both
the religious sphere (a person's relation to God) and the non-religious sphere
(interpersonal relations). In this second sphere, the Sharia can be changed in
accordance with historical and social circumstances. Religious courts in
practical terms are concerned with the second sphere. See K. Vikor,., The Sharia
and the Nation State: Who Can Codify the Divine Law? at
http://www.hf-fak.uib.no/institutte4r/smi/pao/vikor.html.
124 For the West Bank, the Jordanian Law of Personal Status applies, it was
issued in 1976. For the Gaza Strip, the Gaza Law of Family Rights applies, it
was issued by the Egyptian governor-general in 1954.
125 See A. Khadr, Al-quanan wa mustaqubal al-mar'a al-falastinyya (Law and
the Future of Palestinian Women) (WCLAC 1998) (an example of work which
was deliberately and misleadingly portrayed by some Islamist leaders as being
representative of the M project).
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custody as well as the rights and obligations within and outside the
family unit, or example, a wife having the right to work outside the
family home, or to "visit" her parents' house without needing her
husband's permission.
It is important to note that contracts, criminal proceedings, civil
disputes and commercial endeavours are governed by secular law. The
family law is now the only law derived from the Islamic Sharia. The
Sharia system is based upon the fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), which is
considered the "scientific" reflection of the Qur'an and its interpretation.
The Sharia is applied by the Sharia (religious) courts, which have
jurisdiction in matters of personal status and familial relations. This law
is primarily based on the Hanafi doctrine, one of the four major Sunni
schools of law. It also incorporates rules from other Sunni schools.
Under family law, women have no right to make marriage
decisions. A "marriage guardian" or matrimonial tutor makes all
decisions about marriage. 26 The law makes it difficult for a woman to
obtain a divorce because she has to prove that she has been damaged
physically, psychologically and emotionally in the marriage. The grounds
on which the wife can apply for divorce include non-payment of
maintenance, desertion, and certain diseases of the mind and body. The
husband is allowed to break the marital bond at will. 27 The law also
confirms the right of men to have four wives (polygyny) 28 and confirms
126 Chapter 2, Article 11 of the Gaza Law of Family Rights and Chapter 2,
Article 9 of the Jordanian Personal Status Law No. 61. There is some dispute
over whether in fact a woman needs a guardian's permission to marry under the
law. See WELCHMAN, L., ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: TEXT AND
PRACTICE IN PALESTINE (WCLAC Jerusalem 1999).
127 Chapter 10, Articles 85, 86, of the Jordanian Personal Status Law gives the
husband the right to divorce his wife by saying 'talaq' (divorce) on three
separate occasions; even if he says it only on one occasion, his wife is still
divorced if he does not revoke it during the 'Idda' period. This is a period of
three months and ten days after the divorce during which the woman is not
allowed to marry anyone else in order to be sure that she is not already pregnant.
Husbands who are unable to speak are allowed to divorce their wives by making
srecific motions of the head.
Chapter 2, Article 14 of the Gaza Law of Family Rights asserts that a man
has the right to marry only four women. Chapter 5, Article 28 of the Jordanian
Personal Status Law allows a man to marry a fifth time provided he divorces one
of his four wives. The term 'polygyny' denotes the marriage of a man with two
or more women. However, some writers prefer to use the term polygamy, which
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inequalities in matters of inheritance. For example, a daughter receives
half the amount a son would in a similar situation. Under many
circumstances, on matters of inheritance the family law favours distant
male relatives on the man's side of the family over the wife or female
descendants. By favouring males and kin on the male side, family law
solidifies ties within the extended patrilineal kin group. In this way, it
defines the kin group, rather than the nuclear family unit, as the
significant locus of solidarity. It facilitates the maintenance of tribal
communities. The Family Law thus has implications for the broadest
social structures at the same time as it subordinates women.
The Family Law also denies women the right of guardianship
and child custody after divorce. For instance, in Gaza, mothers are
granted the right to serve as "nurses and maids" until their sons are nine
years old and their daughters are 11 years, the age of puberty or
marriage, after which fathers reclaim their "property.'"29 In the West
Bank, the mother "who imprisons herself to look after her children"
(Article 162) is allowed to have custody over both sons and daughters
until they reach the age of puberty. In addition, family law makes
women's mobility as well as their access to employment conditional on
their husband or father's permission.
C. Debate within the MP about Family Law Reform
Some MP members argued that legal reform in general, and that
of family law in particular, promised much but might eventually deliver
little. They believed that it was not enough to change the legal
framework under which women have been subordinated. They argued
that a radical change was needed in the power relations of society,
covering every aspect of life. A change in the codes does not overturn the
existing power relation, cultural practices and deeply ingrained
prejudices.
Legal reform is a complex process. In the Palestinian context of
a Muslim society, movement toward reform could be read as an attack on
notions of "traditions," a sensitive subject that many MP members tried
to avoid. In analyzing the situation, the MP members found that among
religious groups, reform might be endorsed as the realization of the
means the concurrent marriage of a member of one sex with two or more
members of the opposite sex. See Marshall supra note 76.
129 Section 3, Chapter 2, Article 118 of the Gaza Law of Family Rights, and
Chapter 16, Article 162 of the Jordanian Personal Status Law.
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principles of Islamic modernism by "some Mullahs at least" and
criticized as a distortion of Islamic norms and customs by others.
To sum up, the essential focus of the MP debate over family law
revolved around critical questions such as: Who draws the lines of what
is Sharia and what is not? Is it the Ulama (religious officials or scholars)?
Is it the PA? Is it the diverse Islamists? And most importantly, what about
the women's movement and the role of women? What about their diverse
opinions concerning the source of legislation? It was obvious that these
questions could not be answered according to logical or legislative
patterns. They are matters of power. Who controls the symbols? Who
defines the limits? Who defines what is Islamic and what is not? What
are our sources of legislation? These issues are both a result of and an
element in the distribution of power in society.
Moreover, how can we think about legal reform from a historical
perspective, specifically in relation to the traditions of legal, political and
social discourse held by those who possess power? In other words, how
do we perceive the power relation between the women's movement on
one hand and all patriarchal institutions on the other? Do reforms of
family law work in some way to modify or alter existing gender
relations? Should family law reform be considered an important step
towards gender-equality, or simply a "curb" on the patriarchal system?
How do we understand the apparent lack of interest on the part of some
organizations within the women's movement?
Some members raised the dilemma of the women's movement in
dealing with such a complex issue as family law. The law is complex
because, as noted earlier, there is no simple set of rules that constitute the
Sharia. The PA states in its draft of the Basic Law that Islamic Sharia is
the main source of legislation, along with human rights conventions
(Palestinian National Authority, 1996). This poses a dilemma for
legislators as to which source should be used as a basis for legislation
relating to women's rights, in view of the fact that some parts of the
Sharia discriminate against women. Generally, the MP tried to avoid a
confrontation with the PA and the Islamists, for it was clear that the PA
was more concerned with accommodating the Islamists than supporting
women's rights. For instance, when the Women's Charter was presented
to President Arafat in 1995, he responded, "[I] would accept the
principles of the Women's Charter if they did not conflict with Sharia
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law."' 30 The main outcome of the MP was a list of demands aimed at
correcting gender-based discrimination in family law.
The MP's demands with regard to family law reflected a
compromise on the part of the members who wanted to reform the law
strictly in line with human rights conventions. They had to accept the
viewpoint of the other members that the soil was not yet fertile enough
for the seeds of full equal rights before the law. The main demands
agreed by the MP were:
* The minimum age of marriage should be 18 years for both partners.
" Mature partners should not be required to have a marriage guardian's
permission for the marriage contract.
" Women and men should have equal citizenship rights, including the
rights to work outside the family home, continue education, and
participate in politics. Currently, family law allows husbands to deny
their wives participation in such activities.
* Assets earned after marriage should be regarded as joint property and
a court should decide their division.
* Alimony should be paid from the date on which the couple
separated, rather than the date on which the alimony application was
made to the court. The State should have a fund from which support
can be provided to the applicant until the court has ruled on the
application, after which the payments can be recovered from the
other partner.
* Rules and regulations should be formulated and enforced to protect
women and guarantee their right to receive their family inheritance.
* Polygyny should be regulated so that a man is only allowed to marry
more than one woman for serious reasons such as health problems,
and not simply for his pleasure. The husband should not be allowed
to take a second wife without informing the first one, who should
then have the right to ask a court for divorce on that ground.
130 The Women's Charter draws upon the Palestinian Charter of Independence,
the UN Charter, and international human rights charters. It includes, among
other demands, the abolition of all forms of discrimination against women, the
building of a democratic society guaranteeing women equal opportunities, and
the implementation of the principles of gender stipulated in the Palestinian
Charter See N. Abdo, Gender and Politics Under the Palestinian Authority
XXVIII(2) JOURNAL OF PALESTINIAN STUDIES 38-51 (1999). See also
Jad, supra note 37.
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* Divorce by either partner should only be possible through the
decision of a court.
* Because of the possibility of intimidation, a mother's renunciation of
her custody rights should not be accepted. Custody decisions should
apply to children up to the age of 18. If the divorced mother
remarries, a court should decide which parent can have custody on
the basis of the best interests of the children.'
31
These demands, as well as the debate in the MP, sparked an extensive
counter-campaign by the Islamists. There were several reasons for such
panic. The wide publicity received by the MP project was one obvious
element that they found disturbing. The most significant element of the
MP's activities that incensed them was the fact that "inferior,"
"emotional" and "irrational" women were daring to discuss the Sharia
and to challenge the interpretation of the Ulama. This threatened the
hegemony painstakingly built up by the Islamists since the days of the
Intifada. It also evoked memories of how their success in forcing women
to wear the veil during the Intifada had been undermined after the return
of Palestinians to the occupied territories as a result of the Oslo
agreement. Many of the women who returned had a different dress code
and, because of the widespread presence of Palestinian police, the
Islamists were unable to intimidate them. Thus, their control over women
in Gaza as a whole was also weakened. The Islamists were also
infuriated by the fact that the MP trainers and activists, who were mostly
women, were for the most part secular, educated and affiliated to the
leftist parties. As Moghadam observes, 132  Islamists always attack
"women with education ... women who refuse and question the
traditional patriarchal relation ... for they constitute and symbolize a
social change." The Islamist counter-campaign will be discussed in the
next chapter.
IV. The Discourse(s) of the Islamists and the PA
This chapter begins by analyzing the Islamist counter-campaign,
which basically relied on propaganda in which the MP members were
131 Model Parliament, Suggestions for a Unified Family Law, MP Discussion
Paper, Gaza: Palestinian Model Parliament for Women and Legislation (1998).
132 V. Moghadam, Islamist Movement and Women ' Responses, in MODERNIZING
WOMEN; GENDER AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (V. Moghadam
ed. 1993).
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seen as contributing to the "Western conspiracy against Islam." The
Islamists used printed materials as well as speeches in mosques and
elsewhere to denounce "evil women's organizations" with "devilish"
ideas. The chapter also investigates how both the Islamists and the PA
use identity to marginalize women's discourse. The popularity of Islamic
ideology is demonstrated by the results of a poll. The PA's position on
improving Palestinian women's lives is gauged by examining its practice
on various levels. In addition, the chapter compares the discourses of the
PA and the Islamists, to uncover their similarities. Finally, it places the
PA within a framework of its relations with the other actors defined by
the concepts used in this study.
The elections to the Palestinian Council in January 1996 were
the greatest opportunity in many years for the traditional leadership,
kinship identities and affiliations, and patronage system to be arranged in
a political contest. These conservative elements have the full support of
the PA because they can be used, along with the security forces and
police, as means to exercise power. The proliferation of Palestinian
security forces and police can be viewed as the "most advanced and
functional aspect of the neo-patriarchal state.' 33
It is in this environment that the nationalists and Islamists are
competing over issues concerning every aspect of life. The following
questions have become powerful elements of the politics of Palestine
since the Oslo agreement: What kind of state should we build? Who
defines our objectives and aspirations as Palestinian men and women?
How do we define citizenship? What kind of political system do we
adopt? What kind of institutions and practices do we have to encourage
or discourage? And what kind of relations should there be between the
various social powers and their political representatives?
These issues are important to the political powers in Palestine,
especially the Islamists and the nationalists. In this process, the less-
133 Sharabi supra note 34. He believes that Middle Eastern political regimes,
whether they are monarchies or republics, radical or conservative, socialist or
populist, all share the essential features of neo-patriarchy. He applies the concept
even more to describe discourses, relations and institutions in the Arab world.
Neo-patriarchy refers equally to macrostructures (society, state, economy) and
microstructures (the family or the individual). He also believes that neo-
patriarchy is the product of the encounter between modernity and tradition in the
context of dependent capitalism: it is modernized patriarchy. In the context of
this study, such a distinction between patriarchy and neo-patriarchy is
considered unnecessary.
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powerful groups such as women are assumed to belong to one or the
other side and are likely to experience pressures from both sides as the
elements of power identified by Foucault come into play. These forces
include, the multiple and imminent force relations, ceaseless struggle and
confrontation, the two sides' support to/ rejection of each other and the
strategies in which force relations take effect.
Women, family, women's rights, gender roles and identities are
at the core of the process of state building. Issues concerning gender
relations, religion and traditions have their interrelationships, and they
have been the subject of debate because of the changes that have
occurred in Palestinian society since the Oslo agreement of 1993, as
well as, politico-economic changes in general. The 1996 elections
provided Palestinians with a chance to debate the laws and policies that
would direct their social affairs. The elections came three years after
WCLAC and other women's organizations began to raise the
consciousness of women about their legal rights and to conduct research
into Palestinian laws that discriminate against women. These activities
led in 1997 to the MP project, which highlighted the gender-based
discriminatory nature of the inherited legislation in general and family
law in particular.
The articulation of the MP's campaign for "amendment of the
current discriminatory laws", "democratic laws for a democratic state,"
"equal rights for equal citizens," and the MP's demands for equal
importance to be given to the social and political agendas met with much
counter-resistance arising from the particular circumstances in Palestine
in 1997-98. Those circumstances have given rise to, and shaped the
debate around women's rights, particularly those rights that are abused
by family law. Those circumstances also explain the current dilemmas
facing not only the NIP project, but also the whole women's movement in
its struggle for social justice and gender equity.134 One of these dilemmas
was the eternal question raised by various political and social groups:
Does the Palestinian women's movement have a genuine loyalty to
Palestinian culture and traditions? The question is often structured in
134 The Palestinian women's movement covers diverse political positions;
sometimes it is a contradictory amalgam of positions ranging from those of the
extreme Left to those of the Islamist women's organizations. The membership of
the movement is equally diverse, embracing upper- and middle-class leaders,
and activists from the ranks of refugee inhabitants. See Mayer supra note 41.
He observes that the Islamist women's organizations have considerable
influence at the grass-roots level providing services needed by the population.
Fall 2003
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
general terms without reference to a specific tradition or a distinctive
loyalty.
The limited resources of the MP restricted the project's reach.
Also, the lack of co-ordination between women's organizations,'35 leftist
parties and NGOs in general weakened the effect of the MP's message.
The Islamists were able to launch an extensive counter-campaign, which
accused the MP of working against Palestine, Palestinian society, Islamic
norms and Islam as a whole. Helie-Lucas136 shows that the Islamist
discourse offers a consensus on two points: the quest for identity and the
women's question. For the Islamists the worst enemy will always be the
alienated national 6lites who have lost "their identity" and are perceived
to be trying to undermine group identity. By linking the women's
movement with a Western conspiracy against Islam in general and
Palestinians in particular, the Islamists tried to use the distrust of the
West to further its own goals. From Bertsch's perspective, the hegemonic
power of Islam is marshalled to create the illusion of unity, ignoring the
denial of full rights to Palestinian women, which carries the seeds of
disunity. This unity is called up for defense against the "other" in the
form of the West. 37 (This point is elaborated further in section 4.4.)
Anyone who tries to shatter the illusion of collective identity is,
therefore, an accomplice or agent of the West. On this point, Kandiyoti
notes that the Islamists' interpretation of cultural integrity is facilitated
by the equation between changes in gender relations and capitulation to
Western cultural imperialism.1
38
A. The Shape of the Counter-Campaign
Monitoring the printed media over 1997-98 provides substantial
indications of the development of the anti-MP project on the one hand,
and the proliferation of the Islamist discourse on the other. The Islamists
135 Interview with Hanan Rabbani, Director of the MP Project (August 1999).
Rabbani listed three reasons for this lack of coordination: competition over
grants from donor agencies, personal competition over leadership of the
women's organizations, and political competition related to the political vision
and objectives of the women's organizations backed by political parties.
136Helie-Lucas, supra note 101, at 5-12.
137 A. Najmabadi, Veiled Discourse-Unveiled Bodies, 19(3) FEMINIST STUDIES
487, 511 (1993) (finding the same logic within the Islamist's discourse in Iran,
that women are embodied in double 'Other': "the enemy within, Fitna [moral
disorder], and the enemy without, the West").
13' Kandiyoti, supra note 107, at 7-23.
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used printed materials as well as speeches in mosques to develop and
articulate their ideas about women's rights, the role of "evil women's
organizations" in demolishing "Islamic society" and breaking down
Islamic norms and customs, etc. Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, a Palestinian
Islamist ideologue and one of the leaders of Hamas, told a foreign female
journalist: "Women in itself [sic] are not the devil, but the ideas they are
spreading are devilish because they do not respect the Islamic rules.
Those women [MP members], which are a minority, believe that every
revolutionary idea is positive; they did not realize that they are driven by
associations completely extraneous to our society and beliefs."39
The Islamists want to see the Sharia codified as a set of State-
enforced laws in the Western sense. In another interview six months after
the signing of the Oslo agreement and a month before PA president
Yasser Arafat's arrival to the occupied territories, Sheikh Jarrar declared
that the real agenda of Hamas is to ensure that all education curricula are
grounded in "Islamic civilization," not one adulterated by "foreign
influences.' ' 40  Thus, Islamist hegemony would contest the PA in a
classic illustration of Gramsci's conception of cultural hegemony,
manufacturing consent through control of institutions that underpin the
political structure in civil society.
14 1
Asked about the Islamists' attitude towards the new PA, his reply
was highly significant: "[a]lthough the Islamic movement rejects the
declaration of principles [Oslo agreement]. . . it has no interest in
defeating it by force.' 42 He clearly envisioned the possibility of co-
operation with the PA on the basis of the Islamists being allowed to
control social aspects of Palestinians' lives.
Concerning family law, Sheikh Jarrar said the preservation and
consolidation of Sharia law relating to the family; the social reproduction
of the patriarchal Palestinian family, represents the greatest potential
139 Alessandra Antonelli, Women's Parliament Speaks Gender War, an Interview
with Sheikh Jarrar, PALESTINE REPORT, March 20, 1998 at 4-5.
140G. Usher, The Islamist Movement and the Palestinian Authority; Graham
Usher Speaks with Bassam Jarrar, 189 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 24, 28-29 (1994).
41 G. MARSHALL, DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (Oxford University Press 1998).
142 Sheik Bassam Jarrar, The Future of the Islamic Movement's Relation with the
Transitional Authority, THE CHALLENGES FACING PALESTINIAN
SOCIETY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD - FIRST CONFERENCE
(1994). Sheikh Jarrar repeated this attitude in which he declared that the areas
of confrontation, and thus communication with the PA, are the school curricula
and family law.
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prize to Hamas. He said it guarantees Palestinian "human rights as
Muslims.'
143
This is particularly important for Islamists because in most Arab
countries this is explicitly based on Sharia law. It is not necessary for me
to say what I think the Personal Status Law should be. This is a matter of
Ulama. But if the authorities deal with the law in a subjective way, this
could lead to violations of the Sharia and so infringements of our human
rights as Muslims. We are not against innovation in law, but we cannot
compromise on rights that are guaranteed by the Sharia.1
44
The targets of the counter-campaign are the masses, young and
old, women and men, especially in the poor regions, for they constitute
the Islamists' main supporters.145 Islamist leaders of various parties have
given public speeches and issued printed materials expressing suspicion
about the MP's objectives. They have warned about the "dangerous war"
initiated by women's organizations in general, and the MP in particular,
against Islam and Islamic values. 146 Various arguments are presented to
convince their audiences that women are not eligible to discuss family
law. Sometimes they mention the Prophet's Hadith that "woman lacks
143 Usher, supra note 19.
144 Id.
14s In the Middle East, North Africa, as well as South Asia, the main supporters
for Islamists are from middle and lower middle classes. See J. Afary, Feminism
and Fundamentalism, 224 NEW LEFT REVIEW 89, at 89-126 (1997).
146 M. Hamdan, Sheik Jarrar responds to MP Proposals, AL-HAYAT AL
JADEEDA March 13, 1998 at 4. Sheik Jarrar said:
The MP wants to humiliate men; the problem is not political, but religious. We
[the Ulama] have no political objectives. The MP proposals pertain to our lives
and families ... The MP proposals start from 'equality', a notion of Western
origin. We accept the 'equality' notion, but it should be clear that the definition
and conceptualization has to be in the framework of Islam, which gives women
better rights than the West. What the MP presents is against the Sharia and
Qur'an and the consent of Ulama."
Sheik Jarrar then used the Islamists' favorite tactic against the MP, linking it
with Western enemies of Islam:
They are supported by Western funds; they want to enforce the Western
concepts and Western lifestyle over our lives and civilization .... they call for
legitimizing adultery by their proposed condition that such adultery should be
proved by official complaint. Commenting on the women's struggle against the
Israeli occupation, he said "all the Palestinian people participated in the struggle
against Israel; it is not only women's groups ... their participation does not give
them the right to rebel against Sharia.
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reason and religion" or they raise the cultural perception of women as
persons who lack the capacity for the unemotional judgement that is
required for discussing serious political, religious and societal issues.
Interestingly, the Islamist discourse is not monolithic. Sheikh
Jamal Salim, a lecturer on Sharia in Nablus (West Bank) and a staunch
defender of religious courts, dismisses suggestions that it is Islamic to
deny women their rights. He told the Hukook AI-Nas newspaper,
"women's oppression has nothing to do with Islam. Sheikh Salim
contended that Islam has given women all rights and that it is the wrong
traditions and customs that are responsible for women's oppression."
However, he denounced the amendments proposed by the MP as a
manifestation of rebellion against the Qur'an and Islam because he
believed the MP's aim to be elimination of family law and the religious
courts.
147
Sheikh Atta-Alla Abu-Sibbah, a professor of Sharia at the
Islamic University in Gaza, says that Islam allows women to work
outside their homes, but in specific professions. Examples of these
professions are nursing, teaching (especially of children), and medicine.
Moreover, there is no restriction on benefiting from women's exceptional
talents in any field.
48
In an illustration of how hegemony is linked to discursive power,
anonymous leaflets and handbills were also used to attack the MP's
activities as a threat to Palestinian unity against Israel; and at the same
time, the Islamist newspapers offered their readers several weekly
columns to discuss the danger to the Palestinian cause and Islamic values
posed by the MP. The columns were positioned next to a platform for the
discussion of Islam and a range of issues relating to family, marriage,
sexuality, gender relations, female identity and behaviour.
The Islamists fired their final shots in July 1998 during a big
conference in Gaza organized by the Islamic Salvation Party (which is
considered to be the "civil" wing of Hamas). The conference was held
only three months after the MP's central session. Speaker after speaker
147 The interview was done in summer 1998 during the MP campaign, the
newspaper faxed it to the Hague but unfortunately without the exact date.
141 Sheikh Atta-Alla Abu-Sibbah, How Women Are Conceived in Islam,
CONFERENCE ON AL-MARAA ALFILISTINIYAA BAYNA AL-ASALA
WA-ALMOSAARA (Palestinian Woman Between Authenticity and
Contemporariness) (1998).
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repeated the same statements about women and Islam that had been part
of the counter-campaign.
Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, leader of Hamas, asserts that Islam regards
the woman's role as mother and wife as the most sacred and essential one
in society.14 9 He says neither maids nor baby-sitters can possibly take the
mother's place as the educator of upright, complex-free, and carefully
reared children. 150 Such a noble and vital role, which largely shapes the
future of nations, cannot be regarded as "idleness." Women should meet
the obligations of Islam and should prepare themselves to educate future
generations as fighters against the enemy.
This echoes Article Eighteen of the Hamas charter, which states:
The women in the house and the family of Jihad fighters,
whether they are mothers or sisters, carry out the most
important duty of caring for the home and raising the
children upon the moral concepts and values which
derive from Islam; and of educating their sons to observe
the religious injunctions in preparation for the duty of
Jihad awaiting them. Therefore, we must pay attention to
the schools and curricula upon which Muslim girls are
educated, so as to make them righteous mothers, who are
conscious of their duties in the war of liberation. They
must be fully capable of being aware and of grasping the
ways to manage their households. Economy and
avoiding waste in household expenditures are
prerequisites to our ability to pursue our cause in the
difficult circumstances surrounding us. Therefore let
them remember at all times that money saved is
equivalent to blood, which must be made to run in the
veins in order to ensure the continuity of life of our
young and old.151
The biological role of women is the basic tool through which
their identity is shaped and maintained, and it is only recognized in
relation to men. A Palestinian woman's identity is derived from her role
149 Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, Introduction to Conference on Palestinian Woman:
Between Authenticity and Contemporariness, Gaza (1998).
150 id.
151 Hamas Charter, available at
http://palestinecenter.org/cpap/documents/charter.html.
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as a "carrier" but not owner of her body. Her only valuable quality is her
reproductive capability. Hamas portrays women's domesticity as God-
decreed; therefore, any attempt to change the woman's role is sinful and
will corrupt society. In addition, women are referred to as social agents
and educators; therefore they have to be educated not for their own sake
as citizens or human beings, but as a means of restoring the glorious past
of Islam.1
52
According to Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiyya, dean of religious
studies at the Islamic University, Islam gives women only half the
inheritance rights of men because a man's duty is greater than that of a
woman. Furthermore, concerning women's role in the public sphere; for
the position of a judge, for instance, there is a tendency to doubt the
woman's fitness for the post due to her more "emotional nature." The
Prophet's Hadith [says], "A people will not prosper if they let a woman
be their leader" ... According to Islam, the head of state is no mere
figurehead. He leads people in the prayers, especially on Fridays and
festivals; he is continuously engaged in the process of decision-making
pertaining to the security and well-being of his people. It is a "medical
fact" that during their monthly periods and during their pregnancies,
women undergo various psychological and physiological changes. Such
changes may occur during an emergency, thus affecting her decision,
without considering the excessive strain which is produced. Moreover,
some decisions require a maximum of rationality and a minimum of
"emotionality" 
- a requirement which does not coincide with the
"instinctive nature" of women"
153
It is clear that Islamists try to control women by encumbering
them with an identity that limits the options open to them to use their
talents outside the home.
152 L. Taraki, Jordanian Islamists and the Agenda for Women: Between
Discourse and Practice, 32(1) MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 140 (1996). Taraki
finds the same features within the Islamist's discourse in Jordan. In her study,
she finds that the Islamists encourage women's education on the ground that
educated women make better mothers and that it is better for women to provide
services to other women.
1,3 Ahmad Abu Halabiyya, Woman's Role and Position in Islam,
CONFERENCE ON AL-MARAA ALFILISTINIYAA BAYNA AL-ASALA
WA-ALMOSAARA (Palestinian Woman Between Authenticity and
Contemporariness) (1998).
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B. The Issue of Identity: The Link between Hegemony
and Identity
Bertsch links hegemony with the construction of identity, and the
Palestinian experience depicts the connection. 5 4 The construction of
Palestinian identity is very much linked with the patriarchal tradition,
whether it is carried out by the nationalist movement or by the Islamists.
Both use identity to strengthen their hegemony.
The Islamists do this by creating a sharp division between them
(Israel and the West militarily, politically and culturally; and therefore,
by extension, anyone who wants to reform Palestinian society in a way
that would undermine the hegemony of the Islamists) and us (Palestinian
Muslims who accept the Islamists' interpretation of what is Islamic and
what is not).
The Islamists have made powerful claims on the culturally
defined identity of women, including their bodies and their minds. This is
one of the essential elements in their vision of Palestinian society.
Authenticity is viewed as being identical with Islam.
The Islamic awakening means the return to a conscious linkage with
Islam. It also means the will to develop and to achieve using Islam and
its value system as a base ... we cannot look at the Islamic movement as
only political ... it is also ideological and revivalist motivated by a great
past.' ' 155 Thus, the Islamists have a different image of Islam, not the one
actually practised by the masses, but the Islamists' image of the so-called
"true Islam" of the age of the Prophet.
Helie-Lucas refers to the similarities between the Islamist
discourse across Muslim countries. 56 She shows that the discourse
centers on identity in three ways: identity as being under threat, identity
as a return to a glorified past, and identity as confined to the private
sphere. In this way, the discourse portrays women as the weak point in
the defense system as well as potential allies of the external enemy.
Islamists limit their definition of Muslim identity to the private sphere;
the area that is linked with women's sexuality. Hasan makes the
interesting observation that outside the feminist movement, the only
movement which daily devotes hours to discussing, debating and
154 Bertsch, supra note 81.
155 Jarrar, supra note 152, at 159-65.
156 Helie-Lucas, supra note 101.
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formulating policy on the question of women is the Islamist
movement.
57
The PA's concept of identity is based on the definition of
Palestinian citizenship, and this definition is heavily biased towards
males. 58 Throughout the years of the occupation, the Palestinian
nationalist discourse in general downplayed the significance of social
differences (in terms of class and gender) in the name of national unity. 59
Similar to the Islamists, the PA tries to restrict women to the
home, and thus their identity revolves around marriage and motherhood,
which are glorified as being a vital service to the nation.1 60 This is a way
for the PA to retain the consent of the people (and thus maintain its
hegemony). Also it provides the Islamists with the space they desire in
the hope that they will then keep out all others from the political sphere.
However, the PA's vulnerability to external pressures in international
relations tends to complicate this picture at times and the PA then allows
the women's discourse extra room to operate. The MP project was an
example of such a concession. However, as we shall see later, it was a
half-hearted concession, apparently made to please external donors while
having the advantage of focusing the attention of the Islamists on the MP
and thus out of the political sphere.
The Left is another force that has the potential to influence the
formulation of Palestinian identity. Leftists are normally natural allies of
women's movements, even though they may try to influence them
ideologically. However, the Left is not in a hegemonic position in any
sphere of Palestinian life; it relies on alliances and therefore dreads
confrontations. Thus, when women's groups organize to eradicate gender
discrimination they receive a cool response from the Left, which raises
concerns about "washing our dirty linen in public" and giving the
Islamists weapons to use against their Palestinian opponents.'
61
57 Hasan, supra note 28.
158 This ties in with the concept of citizenship rights being closely linked to
gender relations. See Yuval-Davis supra note 98.
159 It is worthwhile to mention that there are ideological differences between the
PLO factions. While the PFLP and DFLP adopt a Marxist ideology, Fatah, the
largest movement, adopts a non-Marxist ideology.
160 PLO leader Yasser Arafat has said, "The wombs of Palestinian women are
bombs in the confrontation with the Israelis."
161 Ironically, during the liberation struggle, the majority of Palestinian female
prisoners in Israel were from Left-wing organizations, while the majority of the
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The focus of the Islamists' attacks is chosen well. Moghadam
observes that "they attack and direct their backlash at this stratum of
women; women with education and jobs, women who refuse and
question the traditional patriarchal relation, women who rebel against
sender discrimination for they constitute and symbolize a social change."
62 EI-Saadawi163 also finds that this mechanism helps to create an
atmosphere in which the Islamists focus on sex discrimination, sexism,
and an emphasis on women as dangerous objects.
C. Popularity of Islamic Discourse
In constructing female identity, and gender relations, both the PA
and the Islamists rely mostly on the strong hegemonic power of Islamic
ideology. Any question about the reaction of Palestinians to this tactic
was dispelled in March 1999 when the Jerusalem Media and
Communication Center conducted a poll to determine the attitude of
Palestinians towards Sharia law and the various political parties.
Respondents were asked: If the PA implements the Islamic law, how will
this affect your position regarding the authority? Will it increase your
support, increase your opposition, or not affect your position at all? The
vast majority of respondents (63.9%) said they would support the PA
more if Islamic Sharia law were implemented. 64 The full results of the
poll are given in Table 4.1.
The results indicate that most Palestinians continue to believe in
the ideal of religious hegemony over everyday life and politics. The
support for the implementation of Islamic Sharia however, is not
indicative of support for the Islamist parties. When broken down by party
support, the poll shows that Hamas and Jihad (representing the main
Islamist parties) together received only 17.3% of the people's support,
while Fatah (the ruling party) received 37.6%. This could indicate that
the Sharia is popularly perceived as a means of orientation which
believers follow out of their own free will, and which the State should
male prisoners were from Fatah. By 1979, 3000 women had been imprisoned in
Israel for political and military activities. See Jad, supra note 37, at 247.
'
62Moghadam, supra note 145.
163 N. El Sasaawi, Fundamentalism a Universal Phenomenon, in DOSSIER,
WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS, No. 9/10 at 30-1 (Grabels 1991).
164 The pollsters interviewed a random sample of 1199 people over the age of 18
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; of these, 49.1% were male and 50.9% were
female.
VOL. I I
GENDER & POLITICS IN PALESTINE
enforce only as a manifestation of cultural identity rather than as real
support for political Islam.
Table 4.1 Change in support for the PA if Sharia law is implemented in
Palestine
165
Response Total West Bank Gaza Strip
Increase my support 63.9 61.1 68.7
Decrease my support 2.4 2.5 2.2
Will not affect 27.0 28.8 24.0
Increase my opposition 1.9 2.6 0.7
Decrease my opposition 2.9 2.5 3.7
No answer 1.9 2.5 0.7
The poll shows that Islam can be used by the PA to strengthen its
hegemony. Of course, whether or not the PA will do so, and to what
extent, is another question. Before taking such a drastic step, the PA
would have to take into account possible reactions in Israel and the U.S.
The support for Islamic laws is also, in part, probably due to the political,
social and economic difficulties experienced by Palestinians. Moghadam
writes that "[the] cultural cannot be properly understood outside of its
relation to the political and especially the economic.'4
66
The people are disappointed that the new Authority has brought
them neither independence nor social justice.167 This plays a great role in
strengthening their belief that justice can be achieved through Islamic
laws. Constructing a mythical past about Islamic justice is one of the
mechanisms used by Palestinians to endure current hardships and dream
of a better future.
So far, this chapter has shown how both the PA and the Islamists
have used religion to strengthen their hegemonic power in Palestine.
165 Jerusalem Media & Communication Center Pub. Op. Poll No.31 On
Palestinian Attitudes Towards Politics March 1999 at
http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/1999/no3I b.htm
'66 V. MOGHADAM, IDENTITY POLITICS AND WOMEN: CULTURAL
REASSERTIONS AND FEMINISMS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
3-26 (1995).
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However, in terms of details, it has concentrated mostly on the tactics
used by Islamists.
D. The PA's Role in Marginalizing the Women's
Discourse
The PA faces pressure on the regional level from Israel and on
the international level from the U.S. to meet its obligations under the
Oslo agreement as the guardian of Israel's security. It responds to this
pressure by implementing a policy of repression, especially towards
those who have been defined by the Israelis and Americans as terrorists
(the Islamists). On the domestic front, the PA rationalizes its repressive
practices towards the Islamists, NGOs and the Press under the old
justifications of "national unity," and "collective interests." The
worsening social and economic situation also makes the PA nervous
about the slightest threat to its power.
The women's movement has not been a direct target of PA
attacks or repression. Therefore, an observer might perceive that the PA
supports the campaign to ensure that Palestinian women are no longer
deprived of their human rights. Such a conclusion would be false. If the
PA were truly interested in changing the social status of Palestinian
women, it would have produced and disseminated informational
documents on the issue and used the media to build support for women.
However, there are no documents; nor are there any records of official
statements/speeches in favour of the women's cause. In the absence of
such documents, this study will gauge the PA's attitude to women's
issues in Palestine by investigating its actual practice: Is it gender-
sensitive? What message does it convey about women? Does the PA try
to help the women's cause in areas where it would be relatively easy to
do so? The answers to questions like these should produce some idea of
what role, if any, the PA plays in the marginalization of Palestinian
women. The questions will be answered after outlining the PA's practice
with relation to the MP, the media, and international donor's community.
E. The Model Parliament
As noted earlier, the PA supported the formation and
deliberations of the MP. Its newspapers and other media reported on the
proceedings every day. In addition, some members of Fatah in the
Legislative Council expressed their readiness to support the proposed
amendments to family law.
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This made some women's organizations optimistic about the
PA's attitude towards women's issues. They felt that in a Palestine
governed by a non-Islamic party, a new area of mobilization had become
accessible. This would help women to negotiate social rights within the
emerging State structures. They asserted that the women's movement
had found its voice post-Oslo in trying to affect a wide range of
emerging social policies that would underpin the progress of women.
168
And then came the intensified attacks and intimidation by the Islamists
who were obviously alarmed over the women's campaign.
The primary aspect of the attack by the Islamists was the
reaction of the PA. Upon request, the police provided security at the
parliament venue (which, after all, was their duty), but that was all. There
was a deafening silence from the PA even as the Islamists increased the
tenor of their attacks, publicly labelling the MP members prostitutes,
spies for Israel and the Western countries in speeches at mosques,
universities and public meetings, as well as through the information
media.
The PA's silence raises doubt about its commitment to women's
rights. It cannot be explained by inability to act: when the Islamists
criticize the peace process or PA practices, the PA reacts harshly with
imprisonment of their activists. Thus, we need to look for another
explanation. The key can be found in Foucault's definition of power as
force relations, the process which, through ceaseless struggles and
confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses [the force relations];
as the support which these force relations find in one another; ... and
lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or
institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the
formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.
16
What benefit could the PA receive from first supporting the MP
and then standing by while it was being attacked? Could the answer be
found in the force relations between it and other actors?
An obvious benefit from support to the MP was the approval of
donors. However, if that had been the main reason for the PA's support,
it would have tried to find some way to curb the attacks on the MP
instead of letting them become worse. There was another, less obvious
168 R. Hammami and E. Kuttab, The Palestinian Feminist Movement: Strategies
Towards Freedom and Democracy, (1999) at
http://aic.netgate.net/nfw/April99/9904po3-09.html.
169 FOUCAULT, supra note 46.
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benefit: the distraction of the Islamists from the peace process. It serves
the interests of the PA to have the Islamists kept busy in a confrontation
with the women's movement because then the PA can proceed with the
peace negotiations unhindered. Thus, the more the Islamists mobilized
against the MP, the greater was the benefit to the PA. It was a perfect
example of how the interactions that make up international power
politics can have a negative effect on the human rights of Palestinian
women.
F. The Media
The PA's use of religion to maintain and strengthen its
hegemony is reflected in its media. The official PA television station
broadcasts a significant amount of discourse on Islam and the assertion
that Islam must at all times govern and define the personal and social life
of Palestinians. There is an increasing amount of religious programming.
Daily broadcasts begin and end with recitations from the Qur'an, the call
to prayer interrupts programming, the Friday mosque prayers are
televised; there are even religious television serials about the early days
of Islam.
One program in particular, broadcast live every Friday at noon,
is aimed at families. Viewers can phone in for information or advice on
matters related to Sharia rules, family life, family law, female dress and
behaviour. The special guest each week is an Ulama from the Ministry of
Islamic Affairs or the mullah of a mosque. Again, the content of the
Islamic discourse is the same as elsewhere. Sometimes the questions are
such that the discussions merely emphasize trivialities and raise them to
a level of great religious or legal significance.1
70
The use of the PA media in this way ties in with the construction
of identity by hegemonies. 7 ' As discussed above, Scott's concept of
gender in the context of relationships of power involved four interrelated
elements: (i) culturally available symbols; (ii) normative concepts that
set forth interpretations of the meanings of the symbols, such as
religious, educational, legal and political doctrines; (iii) politics and
reference to social institutions and organizations; and (iv) subjective
170 For example, a question concerning the effect of nail polish on praying
practice, or one concerning the use of a specific shampoo and its effect on
praying practice.
17 Bertsch, supra note 81.
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identity, which theorizes about the reproduction of gender through
enculturation of the biological sexuality of individuals.
172
The PA, through its TV programmes, creates symbols of ideal
womanhood, interprets those symbols, places them in the political and
institutional context and ensures continued control of women's biological
sexuality. "It is a direct disciplining of women's bodies for political
ends," as Handmaid puts it in another context.
73
It is an irony of Palestine that a secular State is trying its utmost
to prove that it can be as religious as the Islamists. The reason for this is
simple: the PA has no other choice. Having weakened its legitimacy
through corruption and inability to bring economic benefits to the people,
knowing the popularity of the Islamic discourse (as demonstrated most
recently by the poll summarized in Table 4.1) and unable to present an
effective counter-discourse, it is forced to appropriate the discourse of its
rivals. As Moghadam points out, the 61ite deploys cultural resources and
rhetoric to maintain its position and lends it legitimacy, in order to divert
attention from economic failure and social inequalities.1
74
G. Bias Against Half of the Population
As shown in Chapter 2, the PA is an excellent example of a
patriarchy ruled by the president. With the most crucial reins of power
(security, police, interior and exterior ministries, leadership of the
Executive Authority) in his hands, he is well situated to ensure that
women can obtain civil service jobs on an equal basis with men.
However, in the PA patriarchy, civil service jobs are plums given only to
those who are well connected socially and politically.
Almost every ministry in Palestine has a women's department
supported financially by the UNDP (United Nations Development
Program), which together with other international agencies, finances
women's NGOs providing gender-training courses. This might suggest to
an observer that the PA wants to improve the status of women, but that
would be an incorrect conclusion. There are few jobs available to
women, and the training and other gender-related activities are useful for
hiding the patriarchal nature of the PA. International institutions
normally insist on a suitable gender ratio in the programmes they fund.
172 Scott, supra note 67.
173 R. Hammami, Women, the Hiab and the Intifada, (3&4) MIDDLE EAST
REPORT 20,24-8 (1990).
174 MOGHADAM, supra note 184.
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So, to determine how much the PA's rhetoric about women corresponds
with its practice, it is interesting to check to what extent Palestinian
women are benefiting from such programmes.
H. Qur'anic Judgement Versus Modern Legislation?
The examples in the previous sub-sections make it clear that in
its actual practice, the PA has shown that it is not interested in resolving
the serious problems facing Palestinian women. Analyzing the crisis in
the women's movement in Palestine in the post-Oslo period, Hammami
and Kuttab argue that the public portrayal of the women's movement as
an ally of the PA is misleading. They attribute the PA's current
acceptance of women's movement activism as being due to its perception
that the women's movement does not pose a political threat to it.'75 That
leaves an important question unanswered: As the women's movement
develops, a time is bound to come when its success poses a threat to the
patriarchal nature of the PA. What will the PA's position be then?
The Fatah party's secretary in Gaza indicates the real attitude of
the PA, who said, "in any walk of life where Qur'anic judgment was
available, modern legislation should not be introduced." Fatah's weekly
newspaper warned the women's movement not to "overdo its demands as
the society it worked in was Palestinian and not Swedish, Swiss, or
French." The most explicit attitude was taken by Fatah members of the
Legislative Council during a formal meeting with some members of the
MP in Gaza in April 1998. They focused on the need to respect "our
religion" and "our culture." They also said that women's issues were not
a high priority on the PA's agenda because the Israeli occupation was the
primary concern. 76 Their words were almost the same as those of
conservative representatives of the Council at the meeting, these
representatives accused the MP of not observing religious and cultural
traditions and labelled the MP a Western tool because of its funding
sources as well. Obviously, being able to survive only on Western funds
did not make the patriarchal PA a Western tool, but when women
obtained external support for their struggle to win human rights, they
'75 R. Hammami and E. Kuttab, supra note 183. The PA regularly tries to put
human rights centers on the defensive by questioning them about their funding
sources. When the MP project started creating a widespread impact, resulting in
the counter-campaign by the Islamists, the PA began to use similar tactics
against it.
This echoes the nationalist slogans during the liberation struggle, "women
will be liberated when society is."
VOL. I11
GENDER & POLITICS IN PALESTINE
could only be viewed as puppets. This similarity between the PA and the
Islamists was not a coincidence, as the next section will show.
I. Comparison of the Palestinian Authority and Islamist
Discourses
In the 1970s, the Palestine Liberation Organization wanted to
build a "secular" state that would derive its laws from international
conventions and human rights standards. In the late 1980s, changes in
international and regional politics, such as the fall of the Eastern Bloc,
the second Gulf war and the recognition of the U.S. as the sole
superpower, impelled the PLO to accept the Oslo agreement even though
it left many important issues unresolved.
On the other hand, the objective of the Islamists in the 1980s (of
Hamas, in particular), and especially during the Intifada, was to establish
an alternative to the PLO project politically and socially. Hamas' political
alternative was to build a religious Islamic state in which the main source
of legislation would be the Qur'an and Sharia. 7 However, five years
after Oslo, there are some indications that Hamas is changing its
priorities. It is now more concerned with a social agenda than a political
one. In other words, Hamas relies on its relative political power to
achieve social objectives, and specifically regulation of family life.
Jarrar expounded on this position in his quote earlier in this
chapter. During the Intifada resistance, Hamas' activities were less of a
national struggle than a vicious social offensive against all manifestations
of "un-Islamic behaviour," especially in the Gaza Strip where women
were forced to wear the headscarf as a sign of both modesty and
nationalist rectitude. One of the pervasive wall slogans in Gaza at that
time was, "Hamas considers the unveiled to be collaborators with the
enemy."'178 Thus, with a mixture of consent and coercion, Hamas
demonstrated its leading-group power, to use Gramsci's terminology.
It was clear that the wearing of the hijab (veil) was not about
modesty, respect, or nationalism, nor was it to protect women "against
male sexism." There were two objectives here. On the one hand,
imposing hijab would serve to negate female sexuality and redefine
gender rules. 7 9 On the other hand, it would serve to establish a new
178 G. Usher, What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied
Territories, 37(2) RACE AND CLASS 65, 65-80 (1995).
179 Moghadam, supra note 125.
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political reality; redirecting the Intifada from what was seen as a highly
democratic process to a direction that was considered desirable by the
Islamists and Israeli authorities. It was a manifestation of Islamist power
to impose rules by attacking secularist groups and the national movement
at their most vulnerable points: over issues of women's liberation.180 In
doing so, the Islamists distorted values, especially those related to
women's liberation within the national liberation process. In this process,
as Hasan shows, tens of women were murdered as alleged
"collaborators" just because their personal behaviour was not in
conformity with the norms of patriarchal tradition. Thus, the Intifada as a
revolutionary action was turned into a social counter-revolution. In
reaction to Hamas attacks, the unified leadership of the Intifada, which
represented a coalition of different national movements, condemned the
attacks and issued a statement that defined attacks on women as a
political crime.'18  Soon after, the unified leadership modified its
language; called for "national unity" against Israel, and referred
positively to religion in society.
It is not the aim of this thesis to analyze the shortcomings of the
progressive and democratic forces in the Intifada, yet the marginalization
of these forces is of major significance for the political future of
Palestine. Today, the only political opposition to the PA is the Islamists,
who continue their influence through "cleverly calibrated tactics of
guerrilla warfare, political alliances and a pragmatic social agenda."'
8 2
The Islamists' ultimate goal, as we noted above, is not to destroy the
peace process, nor is it to radically oppose the PA's political project.
Their aim is to re-assert Islamic culture as the predominant feature of
Palestine. In the end, the price of the ascendance of Islamists will be paid
not only by women, but by all the democratic, secular and leftist forces
in Palestine.
Hasan believes that Islamist movements have to be analyzed as
anti-democratic, anti-equality and anti-human rights. 8 3 This analysis
180 Hammami, supra note 186.
'8' The basic membership of the Unified Leadership of Intifada consisted of four
major 'secular-nationalist' organizations within the occupied territories: Fatah;
the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); the Democratic Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); and the Palestinian Communist Party
(PCP) See H. Cobban, The PLO and the Intifada, 44(2) THE MIDDLE EAST
JOURNAL 207, 207-33 (1990).
182 Usher, supra note 197.
183 Hasan, supra note 28.
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echoes the argument in Hilal about the lack of democracy in the PA (as
described in Chapter 1), and Abdo who shines the spotlight on the
patriarchal and undemocratic nature of the PA (as outlined in Chapter 2).
Experience with the PA has shown that with reference to the women
question, specifically those critical issues that deal with women's
sexuality, there is no difference between the Islamist and nationalist
discourses.
Generally, the Islamic discourse, whether articulated by PA
institutions or Islamists, explicates an extremely gender-biased
interpretation of Islamic principles and societal values. Their
essentialization is inherent in the willingness to unquestionably adopt
any practice of a so-called "real Muslim" whether these practices are
actual or are imagined, specifically those related to women's sexuality.
Then shift these practices to a sign of national and religious commitment
and cultural relevance. As Moghadam argues, "[s]exual politics are at the
center [of their policies] which seek reordering of society and the
construction of a new moral and cultural order based on rigid sex roles
and the exaltation of the patriarchal family."'
84
Any analysis of the Islamic discourse produced by the Islamists
or PA institutions shows an extremely similar image of family and gender
relations, women, and "ideal Muslim female identity." The discourse
asserts the existence of a "transcultural and transhistorical Muslim
identity and completely negates the diversity of traditions and cultures in
which Islam has been propagated.' 8 5
J. The Use of Culture
Chapter 2 mentioned Chatterjee's 186 observation that nationalist
movements in developing countries divide the domain of culture into two
spheres - the material and the spiritual. This feature is displayed by the
nationalist and Islamist cultural discourses in Palestine, both of which try
to keep the private, spiritual domain - the domain of culture, especially
family values, where women reside - secure from "infection" by
Western values and practices.
The Islamists have no problems with the adoption of Western
techniques and modes of organization, but they have a problem in
adopting non-Islamic "values", especially those related to women's
84 Moghadam, supra note 125.
185 Helie-Lucas, supra note 101.
186 Chatterjee, supra note 114.
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liberation. The adoption of a Western lifestyle by a man is viewed as
modernization, but when a woman does not conform to conservative
conventions, she is regarded as being Westernized, which has negative
corinotations.
The difference between the Islamist and nationalist discourses
lies in the way that each portrays women. The nationalist discourse
attempts to protect society through the protection of women, while the
Islamists attempt to protect society from women. They view women as
innately disgraceful weaklings who can easily be influenced into "evil"
ways. Moghadam187 shows that the Islamist discourse portrays women as
members of society through whom imperialism can penetrate a culture
and wreak havoc on it. The West deprives women of chastity, modesty
and honour through notions of autonomy, sex appeal, immorality,
pornography, and so on. Thus, it can weaken Islamic culture once it is
allowed in.
K. The Influence of Class
Another explanation for the similarities in national and Islamist
discourses where conceptions of gender relations are concerned is that
the leadership of both movements comes from the same class
background. Sharabi writes that the similarity between the discourses is
due to the petty bourgeois origin of the two political movements
88
In the Palestinian context, we witness the phenomenon
mentioned by Sharabi. The patriarchal familialism oppresses women on
one hand and retards the development of the rule of law on the other.
This, combined with total economic dependence on Israel, has helped the
petty bourgeoisie to become stronger and flourish. What makes the
dependency relation worse, as Bishara18 9 mentions, is the readiness of the
Palestinian political 61ite within the PA to forge personal ties with this or
that Israeli official, or disputes as to which group will control this or that
local agency representing Israel or foreign companies. Bishara concludes
that the obstacles preventing the emergence of a Palestinian political 61ite
largely free of this type of dependence are the same as those blocking
democratic transformation. They are rooted in patriarchy 190
187 MOGHADAM supra note 184.
188 Sharabi, supra note 34.
189 A. Bishara, 4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To Declare or Not to
Declare?,, JOURNAL OF PALESTINIAN STUDIES XXVIII(2) at
http://www.ipsijps.org/ips/110/bishara.html.
190 Id.
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IV. Conclusions
The deliberations and activities of the MP became the focus of
an intense campaign by the Islamist parties to "protect" Palestinian
women from being "infected" by the virus of "foreign ideas." The spark
that ignited the firestorm of resistance was the MP examining family law
with a view to proposing changes that would remove its gender-based
discrimination and bring it into line with international human rights
conventions.
However, the repression of women and their restriction within
the domestic sphere is a central element in the discourse of the Islamists.
It is their principal method of controlling women's bodies. Thus, any
change in family law is seen as a threat to their hegemony. An interesting
feature of the resistance by women and the counter-resistance by the
Islamists was that the PA, which had initially shown signs of support to
the women, retired to the sidelines and said nothing.
The experience confirmed that the Palestinian women's
movement needs to engage in a "conscious, planned struggle" if it is to
succeed in creating a new historical bloc. The conscious, planned
struggle has to be founded on an understanding of the force relations at
work in society. This study is an attempt to analyze those force relations
in the context of the work of the MP.
A comparison of the discourses of the PA and the Islamists
shows that there is no significant difference between them vis-A-vis
women's rights. The initial apparent variance in their attitude to the role
of women and their identity has disappeared in practice now that the PA
has appropriated the Islamic discourse in crucial areas related to gender
relations. For the PA, women now act as pawns to be used to sustain and
strengthen its hegemony.
The PA and the Islamist parties co-operate to sacrifice women's
interests because: their patriarchal nature makes them allies against
women; the relative powerlessness of women makes them easy targets;
and the heavy support for the Islamist discourse among the people gives
a political advantage to any party that maintains the gender inequalities
in society. The PA's marginalization of women is an effect of political
pressure from Israel. It is also a way of countering the Islamists and
strengthening its legitimacy. The Islamists marginalize women as part of
their belief system. From their patriarchal viewpoint, they consider
women inferior. They also view the women's movement as an
international anti-Islamic conspiracy. Thus, women's oppression is not
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just an effect of the struggle for power between the PA and the Islamists;
it is an integral part of their patriarchal discourse. The basis of the co-
operation between the PA and the Islamists is accommodation of the
Islamists by the PA, giving them space to communicate their social
agenda, and acceptance by the Islamists of a limited role at the level of
government.
The polarization between the PA and the Islamists occurs in other
areas also. For example, the relations with Israel, international relations,
and the extent to which family law should be islamicized. The reasons
for this polarization lie in the constant struggle between them to
strengthen their hegemony and power at each other's expense, as well as
in the historical experience of the Palestinian people.
It is now possible to come to some conclusions about what must
be done to invest hegemonic strength in the discourse of the Palestinian
women's movement. In order to construct a more effective discourse, we
have to "disarticulate woman from culture, deconstruct the woman as
symbol, reconstruct women as human beings, and problematize women's
rights as human rights."'' One noticeable element in the counter-
campaign of the Islamists was that, despite appearances, they are not a
monolithic force. Within the main discourse, there are multiple
discourses that implicitly, if not openly, challenge each other to some
degree while adhering to the main lines of their common discourse. A
similar situation exists in the PA, where the multiplicity of parties and
their ideologies makes for several (sometimes contradictory) discourses.
Such differences need to be studied and understood for they have
potential value for changing power relations in Palestine. As Foucault
points out, "discourse transmits and produces power, it reinforces it, but
also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to
thwart it."' 92
Both Islamists and the PA use religion for political purposes.
When Islamists raise the issue of religious doctrine in relation to gender
and women's role in society, there is little room for women to negotiate.
The discourse of the Islamists as well as the PA seeks political legitimacy
by defending "Islamic values," especially those values that are
interpreted to deny the legitimacy of women's rights as human rights.
This marginalizes the discourse of women's liberation and women's
rights. The women's movement needs to keep emphasizing that the
"'1 MOGHADAM, supra note 184.
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interpretation of "Islamic values" by the Islamists and PA is nothing but a
political expedience to maintain power at women's expense.
Likewise, the elements of the women's agenda have to be clearly
formulated. The patriarchalism in Palestinian society means that
solutions cannot be achieved piecemeal. The women's movement has to
work on several levels and with different constituencies at the same time,
instead of focusing on a few and ignoring others. It has to find strategies
to work within the all-pervading patriarchalism - which exists even
within the democratic forces, which "were often corrupt, always
undemocratic." Women have to consider themselves as citizens involved
in both political and social aspects of national affairs.
As citizens of a geographical entity facing a national threat,
women have to continue participating in the struggle against the
occupier, even if they live in a "self-autonomous" region. On the national
level, women should join the democratic forces confronting the PA on
questions such as democracy, rule of law, political, cultural and religious
pluralism, equality and social justice, etc. The strong influence of the
Islamists and their total opposition to any change in the position of
women makes it necessary for the women's movement to challenge their
discourse and discredit it.
The dominant ideology in Palestinian society has to be analyzed
in order to construct an ideology that is adequate to the women's political
project. That, in turn, will build and strengthen the women's alternative
(counter-) hegemony' 93. This means that the women's movement has to
rebuild a clear identity of itself as part of the popular movement
confronting the Israeli occupation. It needs to emphasize that national
freedom is not possible while half the population of Palestine is
subordinated by the other half. The women's movement has to identify
itself as part of the democratic movement, which means participating in
the internal political process without ignoring specific gender concerns.
This is fully compatible with working on their specific agenda as women
and raising gender issues in all fields.
193 Bertsch, supra note 8 1.
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Editor's Note
It is now and has always been the vision of this publication to
provide a forum for all perspectives however challenging they may be.
When this journal decided to devote an edition to Islam and law, we felt
this challenge, particularly with the article that follows. Upon the initial
review, the editorial team saw not only the technical problems due to the
different systems of writing but also the provocative substance.
After much contact with the author, who currently lives in
Palestine, we decided we would publish the article. We asked her to help
us by sending us some of her sources. Below is an excerpt from an e-
mail she sent to us in response to our request:
I am back in Gaza again and re-read your email.
Actually, I have some of the articles here but there are
some books and articles that I really cannot find in my
house library. I think you know the situation in Gaza,
where access to books and academic resources is
extremely difficult. I will send you all what I have (by
post mail) and hope you accept my apology of not being
able to find the rest. I wrote this paper when I was in
The Netherlands and most of the references were in the
library there. Another difficulty is the issue if time; I do
not expect that you will receive them by the end of
December due to the usual delay in the post mail
because of the current war.
-Nhada Sh'hada, November 2002
The author's cooperation and desire to have this thesis printed
were phenomenal considering her struggles living under such unstable
conditions in Palestine. Due to her personal experience and current
situation, her article Gender and Politics in Palestine has become
personal to the editors involved and we are proud to share this article
with readers of this Review.
We would like to give special recognition to James T. Gladen,
III who was an editor of this article. He went beyond what was required
of him so that this article could be published.
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